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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis studies how investor sentiment affects the performance of factor momentum. The 
purpose is to understand whether factor and factor momentum returns are driven by mispricing. 
Additionally, this thesis tests whether a target volatility—a measure of risk management—
increases the performance of factor momentum portfolios. Testing the target volatility approach 
on factor momentum portfolios is motived by earlier studies that find benefits of risk 
management on price and industry momentum portfolios. 
 
Factor momentum portfolios are constructed using a dataset of 11 U.S. equity factors. The 
portfolio weights for the risk-managed factor momentum are calculated using option-implied 
market volatility (VIX) as a proxy for the expected volatility. The overall sample period spans 
from July 1965 to December 2019, and from February 1990 through December 2019 for the risk-
managed factor momentum portfolios. The performance of factor momentum portfolios is 
tested against multifactor and mispricing models.  
 
Factor momentum portfolios that are formed with one-month lagged factor returns have 
statistically significant alpha against all considered asset pricing models. In contrast to previous 
studies, factor momentum returns are higher with a relative strength strategy than they are with 
a trend-following strategy. Furthermore, the results suggest that both winner- and loser-factor 
portfolios capture mispricing—the returns of recent winner factors are driven by positive 
earnings surprises while the returns of recent loser factors are driven by negative earnings 
surprises. Contrary to expectations, the long-minus-short factor momentum returns are not 
significantly affected by the contemporaneous investor sentiment. The returns of winner-factor 
portfolios are positively correlated with investor sentiment and significant in all sentiment stats. 
The returns of loser-factor portfolios are significantly positive following high investor sentiment 
and generally indistinguishable from zero following periods of low investor sentiment. Risk-
managed factor momentum portfolios have statistically significant alpha against the unscaled 
portfolios. 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that factor and factor momentum returns are driven by 
mispricing that is more pronounced during periods of high investor sentiment. Betting against 
the recent loser factors increases the performance of factor momentum following periods of 
low investor sentiment but decreases the performance after periods of high investor sentiment. 
Buying recent winner factors is a profitable investment strategy regardless of the investor 
sentiment. Although factor momentum portfolios do not exhibit momentum crashes or 
optionality during bear market states, the performance of factor momentum portfolios can be 
increased using the target volatility approach and measure of option-implied market volatility.  
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1 Introduction 
Price momentum is one of the most robust market anomalies, and it has generated 
statistically significant returns in U.S. equity markets for over 200 years (Geczy & 
Samonov, 2016). Momentum is also persistent in international equity markets, both in 
developed and emerging markets, and across all major asset classes, including currency 
markets and commodity futures (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen, 2013). Recent studies 
show that risk or mispricing factors exhibit momentum (e.g., Gupta & Kelly, 2019), and 
these factor momentum returns cannot be explained with common asset pricing models. 
Instead, a cross-sectional factor momentum explains industry momentum returns 
(Arnott, Clements, Kalesnik, & Linnainmaa, 2018), and a time-series factor momentum 
explains price momentum returns (Ehsani & Linnainmaa, 2019). 
 
Factor momentum can be described as a strategy that bets on factor return continuation 
when a factor has high prior returns and against a factor when it has low or negative 
prior returns. These factors or anomalies are commonly used to capture either 
mispricing or risk in asset pricing models—depending on whether market efficiency is 
regarded as a theory or a fact. To the extent that factor returns stem from mispricing 
between different stock types, like value and growth or quality and junk stocks, the 
direction of mispricing is not relevant for a factor momentum investor in the same sense 
as it is for a factor investor. A factor momentum investor can capture the mispricing 
spread regardless of its direction if the mispricing continues in the short-term (Ehsani & 
Linnainmaa, 2019). The key is a positive short-term autocorrelation of long-short factor 
returns.  
 
To the extent that factor returns are driven by mispricing, it is important to understand 
how investor sentiment affects mispricing and, fundamentally, the profitability of factor 
momentum. Because measures of risk management have proven to be effective for 
other momentum strategies (e.g., Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015), this thesis tests whether 
option-implied market volatility, instead of realized volatility, increases the performance 
of factor momentum. The dataset consists of 11 factors that are widely studied in the 
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academic literature and for which the return data is easily accessible. For these reasons, 
the empirical findings are comparable with studies that use the same data, and the 
results can be replicated with publicly available data. The included factors are asset 
growth, betting against beta, two measures of book-to-market, cash flow-to-price, 
dividend-to-price, earnings-to-price, momentum, operating profitability, quality minus 
junk and short-term reversals.  
 
 
1.1 Previous research 
The first academic research on the price momentum by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
finds that the past 3- to 12-month stock returns can be used to achieve significantly 
positive returns on the following 3- to 12-month periods. In addition to past stock returns, 
cross-sectional momentum can be implemented using the information of earnings 
surprises (Chan, Jegadeesh, & Lakonishok, 1996), industry returns (Moskowitz & 
Grinblatt, 1999) and a measure of 52-week high price (George & Hwang, 2004). Factor 
momentum is studied in a recently published paper of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and in 
working papers of Arnott et al. (2018) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019). These studies 
find that factor momentum outperforms and subsumes both the traditional momentum 
strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the industry momentum of Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999).  
 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) find that the volatility of momentum portfolios is 
predictable and propose a strategy that keeps the volatility of a long-short momentum 
portfolio constant by scaling the portfolio with its past six-month realized trading 
volatility. Barroso and Santa-Clara show that the risk-managed momentum performs 
considerably better than the unscaled momentum strategy by avoiding momentum 
crashes. Moreira and Muir (2017) present a volatility managed strategy that scales the 
monthly portfolio returns with the inverse of previous month’s realized portfolio 
variance. They find that the volatility-managed strategy increases the risk-adjusted 
performance of multiple factors, including momentum, by decreasing leverage during 
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periods of high volatility and increasing leverage during periods of low volatility. Grobys, 
Ruotsalainen and Äijö (2018) show that the target volatility approach of Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015) increases the performance of industry momentum. 
 
Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012) find that long-short mispricing anomalies are more 
profitable after periods of high investor sentiment and that the profitability is driven by 
low short-side returns. Furthermore, Stambaugh et al. show that the long-side portfolio 
returns are not affected by investor sentiment, and they suggest that high investor 
sentiment leads to stronger overpricing of shorted assets and that this mispricing is not 
corrected due to short-sale restrictions.  
 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) find that the high profitability of long-short anomalies in 
high sentiment causes factor momentum to be more profitable during periods of low 
investor sentiment. Factors with negative earnings on preceding year earn, on average, 
0.35% per month during high investor sentiment and -0.22% per month during low 
investor sentiment. Because investor sentiment does not have a similar effect on factors 
with positive returns over the prior year, the monthly spread between winner and loser 
factors increases from 0.18 in high sentiment to 0.71 in low sentiment.  However, Ehsani 
and Linnainmaa do not test how investor sentiment affects the cross-sectional factor 
momentum, but instead, they only consider the relation between 12-month lagged 
time-series factor momentum and investor sentiment.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
This thesis studies how investor sentiment affects the performance of factor momentum 
with the purpose of understanding whether factor and factor momentum returns are 
driven by mispricing. Additionally, this thesis tests whether the target volatility approach 
together with option-implied market volatility increases the performance of factor 
momentum portfolios.  
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Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) suggest that factor momentum returns could be driven 
by mispricing because the performance of factor momentum is affected by investor 
sentiment. However, Ehsani and Linnainmaa do not test how investor sentiment affects 
cross-sectional factor momentum, but instead, they only consider the relation between 
12-month lagged time-series factor momentum and investor sentiment. Arnott et al. 
(2018) suggest similarly that the returns could stem from mispricing, but Arnott et al. or 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) do not specifically address the source of factor momentum in 
their tests.  
 
Since prior studies find some evidence of mispricing, further research is motivated to 
better understand the relation between factor momentum and mispricing in different 
investor sentiment states. This thesis aims to answer whether factor momentum returns 
stem from mispricing by first, testing how investor sentiment affects cross-sectional and 
time-series factor momentum returns, and second, whether the mispricing factors of 
Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) can explain factor momentum returns. This thesis 
contributes to the studies on behavioral finance by extending the research on factor 
momentum and investor sentiment. 
 
Testing the target volatility approach on factor momentum portfolios is motived by 
earlier studies that find benefits of risk management on price momentum (Barroso & 
Santa-Clara, 2015; Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016) and industry momentum (Grobys et al., 
2018) portfolios. Additionally, Moreira and Muir (2017) show that different measures of 
expected volatility can be used to increase the performance of seven long-minus-short 
factor portfolios. So far, measures of risk management, such as target volatility or 
volatility timing, have not yet been tested on factor momentum portfolios. This thesis 
provides a novel contribution to momentum literature by testing whether option-
implied market volatility can be used to increase the performance of factor momentum. 
Testing the benefits of target volatility with factor momentum portfolios also contributes 
to the literature of risk management which currently finds positive results with 
momentum portfolios but no benefits with the market portfolio (Liu, Tang, & Zhou, 2019). 
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I expect that the factor and factor momentum returns are dependent on investor 
sentiment. Based on the findings of previous studies, I expect that long-short factors are 
more profitable following periods of high investor sentiment and that factor momentum 
is inversely more profitable following periods of low investor sentiment. I also expect 
that the risk-managed factor momentum generates abnormal returns and increases the 
performance over unscaled factor momentum.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter introduces the topic, research question and motivation for the study. 
Chapter two lays out the theoretical framework for a more detailed review of previous 
literature and empirical analysis, covering the theory of efficient markets, different asset 
pricing models, behavioral finance and the factors that are used in this study. Chapter 
three reviews previous studies on momentum investing and covers momentum crashes, 
risk-managed momentum strategies and possible explanations for the returns of 
momentum strategies. Chapter four concentrates on factor momentum and reviews the 
findings of recent studies. Chapter five describes the included data and the empirical 
methodology of this study. Furthermore, chapter five tests the performance of factor 
portfolios in detail to better understand the factor momentum strategy. Chapter six tests 
how the investor sentiment affects the performance of factor momentum and whether 
the risk-managed factor momentum increases performance over the unscaled factor 
momentum strategy. Chapter seven concludes the findings of this thesis.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
In order to assess the relation between investor sentiment and factor momentum, and 
the performance of factors and factor momentum in general, it is necessary to start by 
reviewing the theoretical framework of financial markets. The theory provides the 
foundation for asset pricing models and helps to understand the possible limitations of 
this study. Furthermore, it is important to understand how behavioral biases can affect 
decision making and cause market prices to deviate from fundamental values. 
 
 
2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
The purpose of financial markets is to allow efficient allocation of assets, which requires 
that the market prices reflect the information of both current and expected future 
performance (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2012, pp. 6–11). This assumption of efficient price 
formation is also essential in financial theories, and it is formalized as the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). The EMH states that stock prices always fully reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970). Another common assumption in financial theories 
is that the stock prices follow a random walk. The random walk model states that the 
consecutive price changes are independent and identically distributed (Fama, 1970). The 
randomness of consecutive price changes is an intuitive interpretation given that the 
stock prices react to new information that should be unpredictable and random to 
market participants (see, e.g., Bodie et al., 2012, p. 235).  
 
The early studies on stock returns provide support for market efficiency and randomness 
of price changes. Fama (1970) divides the studies on market efficiency into three 
categories: weak form tests, semi-strong form tests, and strong form tests. Weak form 
tests consider whether the information of past stock prices can be used to forecast 
future returns. Semi-strong form tests study the adjustment of stock prices to all publicly 
available information, and strong form tests consider if stock prices adjust to 
monopolistic or private information. Fama concludes that weak form tests find only a 
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little evidence against market efficiency, and tests of semi-strong form efficiency suggest 
that new information is incorporated to stock prices efficiently. The strong form category 
is intended to be only a benchmark for market efficiency, and Fama specifies that it is 
not realistic to expect stock prices to adjust to private information. 
 
A later study on market efficiency by Fama (1991) uses the following categories: tests for 
return predictability, event studies and tests for private information. While these 
categories describe better the contents of studies on market efficiency, the categories of 
the 1970 study are still commonly regarded as the three forms of market efficiency. For 
example, Bodie et al. (2012, pp. 238–239) define that the efficient market hypotheses 
can be categorized as weak, semi-strong and strong form hypotheses. Fama (1991) notes 
that the efficient market hypothesis itself is not testable as studies on market efficiency 
require an asset pricing model. Testing the market efficiency jointly with an asset pricing 
model leads to a joint-hypothesis problem because abnormal returns can be a result of 
market inefficiency or bad modeling of market equilibrium. Therefore, it is not possible 
to conduct direct tests of the EMH and to prove markets efficient or inefficient.  
 
Fama (1991) concludes that event studies provide the most reliable support for market 
efficiency as event studies on daily data are free of the joint-hypothesis problem and 
because the results of event studies mostly support market efficiency. Tests for return 
predictability are a more controversial problem, partly because cross-sectional studies 
are not direct tests of market efficiency, but also because more recent studies find 
evidence of return predictability. These studies are discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. More recent tests for private information include, for example, 
Aboody and Lev (2000) for insider trading and R&D activities. Aboody and Lev find that 
insiders in firms with high R&D investments achieve higher returns than insiders in firms 
that do not have R&D activities. The authors suggest that R&D activities represent 
information asymmetry between insiders and external investors, and therefore insider 
information can be exploited to achieve higher returns.   
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2.2 Stock return predictability and stock market anomalies 
The weak form of the EMH states that past returns cannot be used to predict future 
performance, and this hypothesis is supported by the earliest studies on stock returns. 
Although some studies find evidence of positive autocorrelations in individual stock 
returns, the autocorrelations are weak in terms of statistical significance and absolute 
values (Fama, 1970). The more recent and significant findings that contradict the weak 
form of market efficiency include contrarian and momentum strategies. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987) find that a contrarian strategy consisting of a long position in prior 
long-term loser stocks and short position in prior long-term winner stocks generates 
positive returns on three- to five-year holding periods. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find 
that momentum portfolios, which short recent loser stocks and buy recent winner stocks, 
achieve positive returns on holding periods from 3 to 12 months. 
 
Evidence against the semi-strong form of market efficiency is even more extensive, and 
academic studies have found hundreds of stock market anomalies that seem to predict 
abnormal returns, and which cannot be explained by prevailing theory. There is, however,  
some doubt that some or even a majority of these anomalies are a result of selection 
bias or data mining (e.g., Harvey, Liu, & Zhu, 2016). Hou, Xue and Zhang (2018) replicate 
452 anomalies controlling for micro-cap stocks and find that 65% of all the anomalies fail 
to achieve statistically significant returns. Hou et al. suggest that the originally reported 
anomalies are driven by overweighting micro-cap stocks in the use of equal-weighted 
returns and are not in reality anomalies.  
 
Even if an anomaly is not a result of data mining or selection bias, proving that it 
generates risk-adjusted returns is ambiguous. Anomalies can either be a result of market 
inefficiency, such as mispricing or alternatively an asset pricing model’s incapability to 
measure the risk correctly (Fama, 1991). If the asset pricing model is incapable of 
measuring the risk correctly and the returns of anomalies are a result of a higher risk, 
then the returns of anomalies are consistent with the EMH. The alternative explanation 
is that stock prices do not correctly adjust to all information. 
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McLean and Pontiff (2016) find that anomaly returns tend to get weaker after being 
published in academic journals. They suggest that anomalies are a result of mispricing 
and that the mispricing becomes less pronounced or disappears after investors learn and 
exploit the inefficiency. McLean and Pontiff report that the anomaly returns are, on 
average, 58% lower after publication and 26% lower out-of-sample. The decline in post-
publication returns is more substantial for anomalies that have high returns and high 
statistical significance in the sample period and for anomalies that are based on return 
and trading data only.  
 
Perhaps the three best known and widely recognized stock market anomalies are size, 
value and momentum. The size effect refers to small firms’ tendency to outperform large 
firms (Banz, 1981). Value anomaly means that value stocks have higher average returns 
than growth or glamour stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Robert, 1994). Empirically 
successful measures of value include a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio (Rosenberg, Reid, 
& Lanstein, 1985), high earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio (Basu, 1983) and high cash flow-to-
price (CF/P) ratio (Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1991). The first study to find that small 
firms generate higher risk-adjusted returns than large firms is by Banz (1981). Covering 
the period of 1936–1977, Banz finds that the CAPM cannot explain the returns of the 
smallest stocks. Banz documents that the size effect appears to be strongest among the 
smallest firms, but unstable over a long investing period.  
 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) find that a strategy that buys stocks with a high B/M ratio and 
sells stocks with a low B/M outperforms the S&P 500 index by 0.36% per month during 
January 1973–September 1984. Rosenberg et al. also find strong seasonality in the 
returns of B/M portfolios—the average returns are remarkably high in January, and 
indistinguishable from zero in December. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) find that 
the dividend yield (D/P) is a strong predictor of before tax expected returns. Kothari and 
Shanken (1997) find that both B/M and D/P ratios have a strong relation to expected 
returns over the sample period of 1926-1991.  
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Basu (1977, 1983) finds that portfolios consisting of high E/P stocks generate higher 
average returns with less systematic risk than portfolios of low E/P stocks. Basu uses 
sample periods of 1957–1971 and 1963–1979, and CAPM to measure the systematic risk. 
The differences in returns between high E/P and low E/P stocks are statistically 
significant for all NYSE-listed firms except for those with the largest market 
capitalizations (Basu, 1983). As an interpretation of the results, Basu suggested that 
either the CAPM is not a valid measure of risk or that the NYSE is not entirely efficient. 
 
Chan et al. (1991) study how B/M, E/P, CF/P and size can predict stock returns in the 
Japanese stock market. Covering the period of 1971–1988, Chan et al. find that the B/M 
ratio is statistically the most significant return predictor out of the three ratios. While 
cash flow yield has significant predictive power on expected stock returns, the size is 
significant only in some of the models used. E/P is the least significant variable, and when 
combined with the B/M ratio, the explanatory power of earnings yield is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) provide further evidence on the return predictability of B/M, 
E/P and CF/P ratios using U.S. market data with the sample period of 1963–1990. The 
results of Lakonishok et al. are similar to the results of Chan et al. (1991) in the Japanese 
market. All three ratios have a statistically significant explanatory power on the average 
returns, with cash flow yield having the highest explanatory power (Lakonishok et al., 
1994). Their analysis of long-minus-short portfolios formed on B/M, E/P and CF/P show 
that value stocks outperform glamour stocks on holding periods of one to five years. 
 
B/M, E/P and CF/P anomalies survive the out-of-sample replication of Hou et al. (2018). 
The monthly average returns to long-minus-short strategies are, however, smaller in the 
out-of-sample period from 1967 to 2016 than they are in the original samples. Dividend 
yield fails to generate statistically significant average returns in the same replication test. 
These findings of Hou et al. (2018) are consistent with the results of McLean and Pontiff 
(2016), who find that easy-to-replicate mispricing anomalies have lower returns after 
being published in academic journals. 
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2.3 Asset pricing models 
As noted earlier, many of the early return predictors, such as earnings-to-price, were 
considered to be anomalies because the CAPM could not explain the returns. The CAPM 
is developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) to measure the relationship between 
risk and expected return. The CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is expressed by 
Fama and French (2004) in the following form:1 
 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓]𝛽𝑖𝑀,  (1) 
 
where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) is the expected rate of return for asset i, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate and 
𝛽𝑖𝑀 is the systematic risk (market beta) of asset i. The systematic market risk is measured 
as the correlation between the return of an asset i and the return of the overall market 
(Sharpe, 1964). Unsystematic risk can be diversified, and therefore investors require 
premium only for the stock-specific risk (Lintner, 1965). 
 
The efficient market response to the abnormal risk-adjusted returns described earlier is 
that the beta of the CAPM is not a sufficient measure of risk. Fama and French (2004) 
provide support for this argument by studying the average returns and betas of 
portfolios sorted by the B/M ratio. Covering the period of 1963–2003, they find that 
there is no positive relationship between the annual average returns and the market 
betas as the CAPM fails to explain the average returns of portfolios with the highest B/M 
ratios. These findings of Fama and French (2004) are consistent with the findings of Basu 
(1977, 1983)—stocks with high B/M ratios and stocks with low P/E ratios generate higher 
returns than the CAPM predicts. Fama and French (2004) argue that the unrealistic 
assumptions of the CAPM are not a reason to reject the model as every model makes 
unrealistic assumptions, but the incapability of CAPM to measure the risk correctly 
invalidates it. 
 
1 The CAPM is expressed using the notation of Fama and French (2004) for consistency with the other 
asset pricing models.  
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Fama and French (1992) find that the CAPM beta alone is not a sufficient measure of risk, 
but measures of size, leverage, E/P and B/M can better explain the average stock returns. 
Furthermore, the combination of size and B/M absorbs the explanatory power of 
leverage and E/P. Fama and French suggest that stock risks are multidimensional, and 
when asset pricing is expected to be rational, size and B/M are proxies for risk. Based on 
the results of their 1992 study, Fama and French (1993) identify three stock market risk 
factors that can explain the average stock returns: size, value (B/M) and market factor. 
The value factor is motivated by the relationship between profitability and B/M ratio: 
firms with a high B/M ratio continuously have lower earnings on assets than firms with 
a low B/M ratio. Correspondingly, small firms generally have lower earnings on assets 
than big firms. 
 
The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) is based on their finding that size, 
value and market factors are able to explain the average stock returns. To mimic the 
return-related risk in size and value factors, Fama and French form value-weighted 
portfolios of stocks that are sorted independently into two size groups and three B/M 
groups. Fama and French use the NYSE median market cap as the size breakpoint, and 
the 30th and 70th percentiles of the NYSE B/M ratios as the B/M breakpoints. The size 
factor (SMB) captures the return spread between small-cap and big-cap stocks by being 
long on a portfolio of small stocks and short on a portfolio of big stocks (small-minus-
big). Correspondingly, the value factor (HML) captures the return spread between high 
and low B/M portfolios (high-minus-low). The market factor (𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) measures the 
market portfolio’s (𝑅𝑚) excess return over the risk-free rate (𝑅𝑓), similar to the CAPM. 
The three-factor model can then be expressed in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖, (2) 
 
where the coefficients 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 and ℎ𝑖 measure the asset’s sensitiveness to market, size and 
value factors (Fama & French, 1996). Fama and French show that the three-factor model 
explains the average returns of portfolios formed on E/P, CF/P and sales growth ratios. 
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Carhart (1997) expands the three-factor model with a one-year momentum factor 
because Fama and French (1996) find that the three-factor model is unable to explain 
momentum returns. Carhart (1997) defines the momentum factor as the spread 
between an equal-weighted winner portfolio and an equal-weighted loser portfolio. The 
winner portfolio includes the highest 30% and loser portfolio the lowest 30% of stocks 
sorted by their prior 11-month returns. Carhart uses the four-factor model to explain the 
performance of mutual funds and finds that the four-factor model reduces pricing errors 
of the CAPM and the three-factor model.  
 
A five-factor model of Fama and French (2015) extends the three-factor model with 
profitability and investment factors. Robust minus weak (RMW) measures the return 
spread between high and low profitability firms, and conservative minus aggressive 
(CMA) measures the return spread between low and high investment firms. The five-
factor model is expressed as an extension of the three-factor model in the following form: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 measure the asset’s sensitiveness to factors RMW and CMA (Fama & 
French, 2015). Fama and French show that the five-factor model captures the average 
returns of portfolios formed on size, B/M, profitability and investment better than the 
three-factor model. However, the five-factor model fails to capture the low average 
returns of small stocks with high investment rates and low profitability. They also note 
that the value factor (HML) turns out to be redundant for describing the average returns 
because the other four factors capture the value premium. Fama and French (2016) 
provide further evidence that the five-factor model can explain some of the anomalies 
that the three-factor model cannot explain. When the test assets include portfolios 
sorted on size together with a market beta, net share issues or volatility, the five-factor 
model intercepts are on average smaller than they are for the three-factor model. 
However, the five-factor model does not increase explanatory power over the three-
factor model when portfolios are formed on size and accruals or size and momentum.  
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A six-factor model of Fama and French (2018) extends the five-factor model with a 
momentum factor (UMD), similar to the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Fama and 
French (2018) define the six-factor model in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (4) 
+𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
 
where MKT is the excess market return and 𝑚𝑖 measures the sensitiveness to the UMD 
factor. The resulting six-factor model increases explanatory power over the five-factor 
model (Fama & French, 2018). However, Fama and French note that they have been, and 
still are, reluctant to include factors such as momentum that lack theoretical motivation 
but have robust performance.  
 
Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) propose a three-factor asset pricing model that is intended 
to capture both short- and long-term mispricing. Their model includes a market factor, 
similar to the CAPM, financing factor (FIN) to capture long-term mispricing and post-
earnings announcement drift (PEAD) factor to capture short-term mispricing. The 
financing factor captures the return spread between firms that issue new shares and 
firms that purchase their own shares. Daniel and Hirshleifer explain that the financing 
factor is motivated by firms’ incentives to exploit long-term mispricing by either issuing 
new shares or by repurchasing their own shares. The PEAD factor captures the return 
spread between firms that have positive earnings surprises and firms that have negative 
earnings surprises. Including the PEAD factor is motivated by previous studies that find 
market underreactions to earnings announcements.  
 
Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019)  find that their three-factor model explains well both short- 
and long-term anomalies. They test the model with 34 anomalies, of which three have 
statistically significant alphas on their three-factor model, whereas 18 anomalies have 
statistically significant alphas on the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015).  
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2.4 Behavioral finance 
The theory of efficient markets assumes that market prices reflect all available 
information and adjust efficiently to new information. Numerous studies on behavioral 
finance have questioned this theory of market efficiency—large market price deviations 
from fundamental values or the previously discussed anomalies, among others, are 
difficult to reconcile with the efficient market theory or rationally behaving investors. 
While the modern finance theories are built on market efficiency and rational investors, 
behavioral finance seeks to explain how psychological biases affect the decision making 
and behavior of market participants (De Bondt, Muradoglu, Shefrin, & Staikouras, 2008).  
 
Much of the early research on behavioral finance is motivated by anomalies that seem 
to predict future performance using the information of past returns (e.g., De Bondt & 
Thaler, 1985) or ratios of accounting information to the market price (e.g., Lakonishok et 
al., 1994). Market reactions to earnings-related announcements have also been studied 
extensively, and the evidence suggests that stock prices do not adjust efficiently to new 
information. Ball and Brown (1968) find that stock returns exhibit positive drifts after 
positive earnings announcements and negative drifts after negative earnings 
announcements. Sloan (1996) finds that stock prices do not adjust efficiently to 
information about future earnings because investors fail to distinguish the difference 
between accrual and cash flow components of the reported earnings. As a result, firms 
with low levels of accruals earn abnormally high returns, and firms with high accruals 
earn abnormally low returns around subsequent earnings announcements.  
 
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2011) suggest that investors pay limited attention to earnings-
related news—some investors are likely to neglect the information of the latest earnings 
surprise, and some are likely to neglect the information of accruals and cash flows. Their 
model of misreactions states that stock prices underreact to earnings surprises and 
overreact to accruals relative to cash flows. Hirshleifer et al. suggest that the 
underreaction to earnings surprises explains post-earnings announcement drifts, and 
overreaction to accruals relative to cash flows explains cash flow and accruals anomalies.  
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Studies by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) attempt to model both long-term return reversals and 
short-term return continuation by explaining how investors under- and overreact to new 
information. Barberis et al. (1998) use conservatism and representativeness heuristics 
to explain how investors interpret earnings announcements. They suggest that investors 
underreact to earnings announcements and overreact to both positive and negative 
series of recurring events. Conservatism causes investors to neglect the importance of 
new information, and therefore, investors are likely to underreact to new information. 
Representativeness, on the other hand, can cause investors to interpret a series of past 
events as a representative of a future trend and thus overreact to a seeming trend.  
 
Daniel et al. (1998) explain investors’ misreactions using overconfidence and self-
attribution biases. They suggest that overly confident investors overestimate the value 
of their private information, such as an analysis of a financial statement, and 
underestimate their forecast errors. The biased self-attribution further strengthens the 
overconfidence if public information confirms the earlier private information. Because 
public information that contradicts the private information does not decrease investors’ 
confidence as much as confirming information rises it, the overconfidence is generally 
increased after new information releases. Daniel et al. conclude that investors are likely 
to overreact to private information and underreact to public information. 
 
The model of Barberis et al. (1998) assumes that the earnings follow a random walk, but 
investors are not aware of it. If investors expect a future announcement to be positive 
after a series of positive announcements, a positive announcement does not 
significantly impact the market price as the outcome is as predicted. However, a negative 
announcement would have a significantly negative impact on the market price as the 
outcome would surprise investors. The opposite is true when investors expect a negative 
announcement. Barberis et al. explain that the overreaction can, therefore, be observed 
either as a negative average return after a series of positive announcements or as a 
positive average return after a series of negative announcements.  
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While the models of Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998) focus on the behavior 
of individual investors, Hong and Stein (1999) attempt to model the interaction of two 
groups of investors: the first group of investors tends to underreact to new information, 
and the second group of investors seeks to exploit the underreaction by arbitrage. Hong 
and Stein assume that the new information is private—or at least requires private 
information to be analyzed—and that the information spreads gradually among the first 
group of investors. Another condition of the model is that the arbitrageurs are limited to 
use the information about past prices only. Hong and Stein explain that together the 
conditions imply that the first arbitrageurs can exploit the initial underreaction and 
continue to profit in the “momentum cycle”, but without complete information of the 
current fundamental value, the later arbitrageurs cause overreaction as the market price 
of a stock exceeds its fundamental value (1999, p. 2145).  
 
In addition to behavioral biases, an important aspect of behavioral finance is limits to 
arbitrage. The limits to arbitrage describe the barriers that prevent arbitrageurs from 
eliminating inefficiencies in market prices. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990) argue that “noise traders” cause market prices to deviate from their fundamental 
values and that arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the mispricing because noise traders are 
unpredictable. Because market prices can deviate even further from their fundamental 
values, eliminating the mispricing is both risky and costly in the short-term. 
 
In a similar vein, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 35) argue that realistic arbitrage 
opportunities are risky and require capital, unlike the “textbook” definition of arbitrage, 
which describes arbitrage as a risk-free opportunity to exploit mispricing. Shleifer and 
Vishny suggest that individual investors have generally limited resources and knowledge 
to exploit mispricing, and fund managers are likely to avoid the most profitable but 
volatile arbitrage opportunities in a fear of short-run price risk. If the mispricing deepens 
in the short-run, portfolio managers might not have enough liquidity to hold the position 
due to increasing capital requirements and fear of capital withdraws. The mispricing is 
further increased if the investors are required to liquidate their positions. 
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2.5 Investor sentiment 
Investor sentiment describes how investors perceive the prevailing market state or how 
investors are expecting the market to develop in the near future. Barberis et al. (1998) 
and Daniel et al. (1998) model how behavioral biases, such as representativeness and 
overconfidence, cause mispricing and affect the investor sentiment. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) find that the expected investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock 
returns. When the investor sentiment is expected to be low, the returns are on average 
higher for high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, stocks that do not pay dividends and 
for recently listed companies, than they are for low volatility stocks, profitable stocks, 
stocks that pay dividends or more mature stocks. These patterns reverse when the 
sentiment is expected to be high. The returns to small stocks are notably higher than for 
large stocks during a low investor sentiment, but the size effect does not exist during 
high sentiment.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure the investor sentiment with six proxies: the NYSE 
total turnover, discount on closed-end funds, dividend premium, equity share in new 
equity issues, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs. The investor sentiment 
index is obtained by regressing each proxy on growth in industrial production, growth in 
consumer durables, nondurables and services, and on an NBER recession dummy, and 
then taking the first principal components of the regression residual series. The 
orthogonalization is done to capture only the variation in investor sentiment that is not 
due to normal business cycle variation.  
 
As the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006) show, companies that are the most affected 
by the investor sentiment are those that are difficult to value. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 
p. 1648) suggest that if investor sentiment is defined as “the propensity to speculate,” 
then high investor sentiment increases the demand for speculative stocks, and low 
investor sentiment decreases it. Higher demand for speculative stocks lowers their 
expected returns in high investor sentiment, and correspondingly lower demand in low 
sentiment increases the expected returns. Speculative stocks are also harder to arbitrage 
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due to the limitations pointed by De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In 
contrast, Baker and Wurgler (2007, p. 132) suggest that “bond-like” stocks that are easy 
to value—i.e., stocks that have tangible assets and long earnings history—and easy to 
arbitrage are not similarly subject to investor sentiment. By studying the average returns 
following months of high and low investor sentiment states, Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
show that speculative stocks have higher average returns than bond-like stocks following 
months of low investor sentiment and lower average returns following months of high 
investor sentiment. This suggests finding that speculative stocks become overvalued in 
high sentiment and earn lower average returns subsequently in the following month.  
 
 
2.6 Additional factors 
So far, this chapter has presented B/M, E/P, CF/P and D/P anomalies in addition to 
momentum and short-term reversal anomalies. Technically, if B/M, E/P, CF/P and D/P 
ratios are proxies for risk—rather than for mispricing—as suggested by Fama and French 
(1993, 2004), then these ratios are not anomalies, but instead risk factors. For 
consistency, the remaining of this thesis refers to all long-minus-short strategies as 
factors regardless of whether they capture mispricing or risk. The remaining of this 
chapter reviews asset growth, operating profitability, betting against beta, quality minus 
junk and a refined value factor.  
 
Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) find that asset growth rates, measured as the annual 
changes in total assets, have a strong predictive power on future stock returns. The 
correlation between a firm’s asset growth and its subsequent market return is negative 
and statistically significant. Firms with the lowest asset growth rates earn abnormally 
high returns, and firms with the highest asset growth rates earn abnormally low returns. 
Cooper et al. rank stocks annually to ten decile portfolios based on their asset growth 
rates from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1. The monthly average return to 
buying the bottom decile and selling the top decile, rebalancing the portfolio annually, 
is 1.73% using equal-weighted portfolios and 1.05% using value-weighted portfolios. 
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Novy-Marx (2013) finds that profitable firms have significantly higher average returns 
than unprofitable firms. Novy-Marx measures the profitability using a ratio of gross 
profits-to-assets, where gross profits are defined as the total revenue minus cost of 
goods sold. The gross profitability has a similar explanatory power on the cross-section 
of average returns as the B/M ratio. The portfolios that are formed on gross profits-to-
assets have both value and growth characteristics because profitable firms have low B/M 
ratios, and unprofitable firms have high B/M ratios. Novy-Marx suggests that the 
measure of gross profitability is best combined with value strategies because value and 
gross profitability are negatively correlated. Sorting stocks on both value and gross 
profitability results in a strategy that buys profitable value firms and sells unprofitable 
growth firms. The volatility of the combined value and gross profitability strategy is lower 
than for standalone strategies. 
 
Fama and French (2015) adapt profitability in their five-factor model using operating 
profitability (OP), which is defined as the revenue minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, 
general and administrative expenses, minus interest expense and divided by book equity. 
The investment factor in the five-factor model is identical to the asset growth of Cooper 
et al. (2008) as both factors measure the change in total assets from the end of year t-2 
to the end of year t-1.  
 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) introduce a betting against beta (BAB) strategy that buys 
low beta stocks and sells high beta stocks. Because both individual and institutional 
investors are commonly subject to leverage and margin constraints, Frazzini and 
Pedersen suggest that investors overweight high-beta stocks, which in turn lowers their 
expected returns in comparison to low-beta stocks. The BAB strategy is constructed by 
buying low-beta stocks and then leveraging the total beta of the long position to one and 
selling high-beta stocks and then de-levering the total beta of the short position to one. 
The resulting strategy is a zero-cost strategy and has a beta of zero.  
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Asness and Frazzini (2013) suggest that a monthly rebalanced HML factor (HMLD), which 
uses the current market value of equity, is a better proxy for value than the one proposed 
by Fama and French (1992). Fama and French construct and rebalance the HML factor 
annually at the end of June and use six months lagged information of book equity and 
market value to ensure that the accounting information for a fiscal year preceding the 
portfolio construction would have been publicly available at the time. The HML factor is 
therefore based on information that is always at least six months old, and just before the 
next rebalancing, the information is 18 months old. Asness and Frazzini (2013) find that 
rebalancing the HML factor monthly and using the contemporaneous market value of 
equity yields a better proxy for the actual ex-post B/M ratio. The monthly updated 
measure of value also outperforms the annually updated factor when used together with 
momentum. 
 
Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2019) find that high-quality stocks, defined in terms of 
high profitability, high prior growth and safety,  generate on average higher risk-adjusted 
returns than low-quality stocks with the opposite characteristics. The authors measure 
quality using a composite score of profitability, growth and safety. Asness et al. follow 
the methodology of Asness and Frazzini (2013), and sort stocks first on size and then on 
quality. The quality minus junk (QMJ) factor return is obtained by subtracting the average 
return of two low-quality portfolios from the average return of two high-quality 
portfolios.  
 
Asness et al. (2019) do not find any evidence of quality stocks bearing higher risk than 
junk stocks. The quality stocks have low market betas, and they tend to perform well in 
market downturns when investors prefer quality over uncertainty. The authors find that 
analysts’ target prices are higher for high-quality stocks than they are for low-quality 
stocks, but the analysts tend to underestimate the return potential of high-quality stocks. 
Asness et al. conclude that quality stocks outperform junk stocks either because quality 
stocks are underpriced and junk stocks overpriced, or because quality stocks are exposed 
to an unknown risk factor.  
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3 Momentum strategies 
The first research on momentum strategy by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) finds that the 
past 3- to 12-month stock returns predict return continuation for the following 3- to 12-
month period—recent winners keep winning and recent losers keep losing more. Earlier 
studies on stock return predictability had found evidence of return reversals on periods 
of one week (Lehmann, 1990) to one month (Jegadeesh, 1990), and on periods of 3 to 5 
years (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985, 1987). Together the findings suggest that extreme past 
returns are positively correlated with future returns on 3- to 12-month periods but 
negatively correlated on periods shorter than a month and longer than a year.  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) construct their winner and loser portfolios by ranking 
stocks monthly in ascending order based on their past 3-, 6-, 9- or 12-month returns and 
then dividing the stocks into ten equally weighted decile portfolios. Their strategy takes 
a short position in the loser portfolio (top decile) and a long position in the winner 
portfolio, resulting in a zero-cost momentum strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman consider 
both a strategy that forms portfolios immediately at the end of the formation period and 
an alternative strategy which forms portfolios one week after the past returns have been 
measured. Skipping a week between the formation and holding periods is motivated by 
the findings of Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990)—bid-ask bounce and illiquidity 
might cause negative autocorrelation on a short-term. 
 
The monthly average returns to winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolios on 3-, 6-, 9- and 
12-month holding periods are positive for all combinations during the sample period of 
1965-1989 (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). The returns are statistically significant for all 
combinations except for a strategy that is formed on 3-month lagged returns and then 
held for three months without skipping a week in-between. The returns are, on average, 
slightly higher for portfolios that are formed one week after the holding period. The 
highest monthly average return of 1.49% (with t-statistic of 4.28) is achieved with 12-
month lagged returns and 3-month holding period, and by skipping a week between the 
formation and holding periods. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also note that the average returns to their relative strength 
strategy turn negative one year after the portfolio formation and continue to be negative 
for the whole second year. The negative returns are not statistically significant, but the 
cumulative returns to a 6-month-6-month WML strategy decrease from 9.51% at the end 
of the first year to 5.56% at the end of the second year. Since Jegadeesh and Titman find 
robust returns to a zero-cost strategy that uses the information of past returns only, 
much of the early research on momentum focus on explaining the reason for momentum 
returns and testing the strategy out-of-sample to account for the possibility of data 
mining. The strategy is tested out-of-sample also by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) with 
similar results to their 1993 study. Covering the period of 1965–1998, Jegadeesh and 
Titman find statistically significant momentum premia of about one percent per month. 
 
The continuation of past extreme returns is not specific to the United States and equity 
markets only as momentum returns appear to be robust internationally and across asset 
classes. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds statistically significant momentum premia in 
individual stocks of 12 European countries during 1980–1995. Asness et al. (2013) find 
similarly significant momentum premia in individual European stocks during 1974-2011 
and in U.K. stocks during 1972–2011. The results are similar, although weaker in terms 
of average returns, for 20 emerging countries as one universe (Rouwenhorst, 1999). A 
remarkable exception is Japan, where momentum has not been found to generate 
statistically significant returns (Asness et al., 2013; Fama & French, 2012). 
 
Asness, Liew and Stevens (1997) find that international country equity indices generate 
momentum returns that are similar to the momentum returns of U.S. stocks. Similarly, 
Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) find significant momentum in international country 
equity indices on periods of 1 to 26 weeks. The evidence of momentum returns outside 
equity markets includes Asness et al. (2013) for commodities, Menkhoff, Sarno, 
Schmeling and Schrimpf (2012) for currencies and Liu and Tsyvinski (2018) for 
cryptocurrencies. 
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In addition to past returns, academic studies have found multiple other measures that 
can be used to predict short-term return continuation and to explain the momentum 
returns. Chan et al. (1996) find that significant earnings surprises predict stock return 
continuation—a positive surprise predicts positive abnormal returns, and a negative 
surprise predicts negative abnormal returns for the subsequent six months after the 
portfolio formation. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) suggest that industry components 
can explain the excess returns of price momentum. George and Hwang (2004) propose 
that the information of a 52-week high price explains the returns of price momentum 
portfolios. 
 
Chan et al. (1996) find three measures of earnings surprises that can be used to capture 
earnings momentum: standardized unexpected earnings, cumulative abnormal stock 
returns around the previous earnings announcement day and changes in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. When momentum portfolios are formed using any of these three 
measures, the spreads between winner and loser portfolios are positive for 6- and 12-
month holding periods. The average 6-month earnings momentum returns vary 
between 5.9% and 7.7%, and 12-month returns between 7.5% and 9.7%. In contrast, 
Chan et al. report the average price momentum returns to be 8.8% and 15.4%, 
respectively. Although earnings momentum portfolios have lower average returns than 
price momentum portfolios, each of the momentum strategies has predictive power that 
cannot be explained by the other strategies. The findings of Chan et al. suggest that each 
of these strategies is, at least partly, driven by different market inefficiency or risk factor. 
 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) form industry momentum portfolios by allocating 
individual stocks to 20 value-weighted portfolios based on their industry. They sort the 
portfolios monthly on past 1- to 6-month industry returns to form a zero-cost strategy 
that buys the top three industries and sells the bottom three industries. Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt report the monthly industry momentum returns for 1- to 36-month holding 
periods, and find that the performance of industry momentum differs from the 
performance of stock price momentum. 
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First, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) note that the industry momentum achieves its 
highest monthly average return of 1.05% (with t-statistic of 5.63)  when the portfolios 
are formed using one-month lagged returns and held for one month. The monthly 
average return decreases to 0.43% (with t-statistic of 4.24) when the formation and 
holding periods are extended to six months. The decrease in long-short returns is mainly 
driven by the decreasing profitability of winner portfolios. Moskowitz and Grinblatt find 
that the profitability of winner portfolios decreases when the holding periods are 
extended, but the loser portfolios become more profitable on longer holding periods. In 
comparison, the profitability of individual stock momentum is mainly explained by 
selling loser stocks.  
 
Second, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that industry momentum can explain price 
momentum almost entirely. When the 6-6 price momentum strategy is adjusted for 
industry returns, its monthly average returns decrease from 0.43% to 0.13%, and the 
significance level drops from 4.65 to 2.04. Cross-sectional regression analysis provides 
similar results—Moskowitz and Grinblatt find that industry momentum subsumes 
individual stock momentum when the formation period is six months and holding period 
one or six months. However, industry momentum does not completely explain stock 
price momentum when the portfolios are formed on 12-month lagged returns and held 
for one month.  
 
The 52-week high momentum of George and Hwang (2004) is based on the information 
of individual stocks’ nearness to 52-week high price, and the authors find that their 
strategy provides superior returns in comparison to momentum strategies that are 
formed on past returns.  At the beginning of each month, George and Hwang sort all 
included stocks on a ratio of current price to 52-week high price. The 30% of stocks with 
the highest ratio are assigned to the winner portfolio and the bottom 30% to the loser 
portfolio. George and Hwang also form portfolios on past stock returns and past industry 
returns to test the explanatory power of their 52-week high price against other 
momentum strategies.  
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The zero-cost portfolio returns of George and Hwang (2004) are similar to the ones 
obtained by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). The 
monthly average returns on a 12-month holding period are 1.07% when the portfolios 
are formed on past 6-month stock returns and 0.50% when formed on industry returns. 
The corresponding return for 52-week high momentum is 1.23%. George and Hwang 
(2004) compare the three strategies simultaneously by regressing the returns of 
individual stocks on dummy variables for each momentum strategy, and on control 
variables for size and possible bid-ask bounce effects. The regressions results suggest 
that the 52-week high momentum strategy yields over twice as large returns as price or 
industry momentum strategies after controlling for size and bid-ask spread. 
 
The momentum strategies reviewed above are cross-sectional strategies that measure 
the relative performance of an asset against other assets. An alternative, trend-following, 
or time-series momentum strategy was first proposed by Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen 
(2012). The time-series momentum is built on a finding that the past 12-month abnormal 
return of a security will predict a positive trend that lasts up to a year. The difference 
between cross-sectional and time-series momentum strategies is in how the past 
performance is measured. Cross-sectional strategies measure the relative performance 
of an asset against other assets. In contrast, time-series strategies measure the absolute 
performance of an asset, meaning the asset’s own trend (Moskowitz et al., 2012).  
 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) find positive time-series momentum in bond, commodity, 
currency and equity index futures across international and U.S. markets.  Georgopoulou 
and Wang (2017) find that the time-series momentum generates robust and positive 
abnormal returns across asset classes in both developed and emerging markets. The 
trend-following momentum returns are higher in emerging markets but more robust to 
different formation and holding periods in developed markets. Hurst, Ooi and Pedersen 
(2017) find results that are similar to Moskowitz et al. (2012) by studying the 
performance of time-series momentum from 1880 to 2016 on global futures contracts.  
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3.1 Momentum crashes  
Notwithstanding the superior performance of momentum, the cross-sectional long-
minus-short strategy suffers extreme negative returns, momentum crashes, after sharp 
market downturns. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the momentum strategy lost 
73.42% of its value within three months in 2009, when the stock market started to 
recover (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015). Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) find that the 
extreme drawdowns of zero-cost momentum portfolios are clustered, and these 
momentum crashes occur after a long market decline when market prices have reached 
the bottom and start to recover. The market recovery is mainly driven by stocks with the 
worst recent returns, and as momentum strategies short these same stocks, the strong 
market recovery results in a momentum crash. After long periods of highly volatile and 
declining equity markets, the largest negative monthly returns of momentum portfolios 
exceed the cumulative prior two-year losses of the overall stock market. For example, in 
April 2009, the cumulative prior two-year stock market return was -40.62%, and the 
stock market was recovering with a monthly return of 10.20%, but the long-short 
momentum experienced a loss of -45.52% (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016). 
 
The long-run performance of the momentum factor is remarkably different from value, 
size and market factors. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) find that during the period 
1927–2011, momentum has the worst one-month drawdown (-78.96%), highest 
annualized mean excess return (14.46%), highest annualized standard deviation (27.53%) 
and highest Sharpe ratio (0.53) in comparison to the other factors. Momentum is the 
only factor that has a negatively skewed (-2.47) return distribution, and together with a 
high kurtosis (18.24) the return distribution clearly shows the left tail risk of momentum 
strategy. The value factor, for example, has a skewness of 1.84 with kurtosis of 15.63, but 
it also has a significantly lower annualized mean excess return (4.50%). The value factor 
has a far less negative worst 1-month return (-13.45%), lower standard deviation 
(18.96%) and lower Sharpe ratio (0.36) than the momentum factor. After controlling for 
market, size and value factors, momentum has significantly negative loadings on all three 
factors and a monthly alpha of 1.75% (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015). 
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Instead of focusing on absolute returns, an alternative approach to assess momentum 
crashes is to study how the betas of momentum portfolios vary over time. Grundy and 
Martin (2001) find that momentum portfolios have negative betas when the portfolio 
formation period includes bear markets. The winner-minus-loser strategy is long low-
beta stocks and short high-beta stocks, thus resulting in negative portfolio betas. The 
opposite is true when the formation period includes bull markets, and the WML strategy 
is long high-beta stocks and short low-beta stocks. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) estimate 
the WML betas during a bear market to be -0.74 when the contemporaneous market 
return is negative, and -1.79 when the market return is positive.2 The corresponding bear 
market beta estimates for the loser portfolio are 1.56 during the up-market and 2.16 
during the down-market. 
 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) note that the asymmetry of up-market and down-market 
betas following bear markets cause the WML momentum portfolios to behave like a 
short call option on the market. After a bear market, the payoffs for both cross-sectional 
momentum and written call option on the market are small and positive when the 
market keeps declining, but large and negative when the market starts to recover. This 
option-like behavior of momentum is only present after bear markets. 
 
 
3.2 Risk-managed momentum 
The disastrously large negative returns of momentum crashes have motivated 
researches to invent and test different measures for hedging momentum portfolios 
against the market risk. Based on their finding that momentum has a time-varying factor 
exposure, Grundy and Martin (2001) argue that this market risk can be hedged by 
removing momentum’s exposure to market and size factors. Grundy and Martin estimate 
the factor exposures using realized returns, meaning that their strategy is not 
implementable ex-ante. The benefits of this strategy are still unambiguous, as hedging 
 
2 Daniel and Moskowitz (2016, p. 226) define a bear market as a period when the cumulative prior two-
year market return is negative. 
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the exposure to size and market factors removes 78.6% of the monthly return variance 
while still increasing the average monthly return from 0.44% (with t-statistic of 1.83) to 
1.34% (with t-statistic of 12.11) (Grundy & Martin, 2001). Grundy and Martin find that 
the better performance of the hedged momentum strategy is mainly due to removing 
the strategy’s bet against size effect in January. Momentum’s weak performance in 
January is also documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), who find that the average 
return in January is -1.55% and 1.48% in other months.  
 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) find that the volatility of momentum portfolios is 
predictable, and propose a momentum strategy that keeps the volatility of a long-short 
momentum portfolio constant by scaling the portfolio with its past six-month realized 
trading volatility. Because the strategy uses only ex-ante realized volatility, it is 
implementable, unlike the strategy proposed by Grundy and Martin (2001). Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015, p. 115) estimate the monthly variance forecast from past six-month 
returns using the following model: 
 
 ?̂?𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡
2 =
21 ∑ 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑑𝑡−1−𝑗
2125
𝑗=0
126
, (5) 
 
where ?̂?𝑡
2 denotes the estimated variance of the WML portfolio for the next month, 
{𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑑}𝑑=1
𝐷
 indicates the daily momentum returns and {𝑑𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇  the time series of each 
month’s last trading dates. The scaled WML return, 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡, in month t is then obtained 
by scaling the WML return with the forecasted variance:  
 
 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡 =
12%
?̂?𝑡
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡, (6) 
 
where 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 denotes the unscaled momentum return of the WML portfolio in month t, 
and 12% is the targeted annualized volatility (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015, p. 115). The 
resulting strategy is a zero-cost portfolio that allows the weights on winner and loser 
portfolios to be different from one.  
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Similarly to Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015), also Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) suggest 
that the volatility of momentum portfolios can be forecasted to avoid momentum 
crashes. Daniel and Moskowitz propose a dynamic momentum strategy that uses the 
forecasted return and variance of the WML portfolio to estimate a dynamic weight for 
scaling the momentum portfolio. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016, p. 233) estimate the 
dynamic weight w* on the WML portfolio at time t-1 using the following equation: 
 
 𝑤𝑡−1
∗ = ( 1
2𝜆
)
𝜇𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡−1
2  ,  (7) 
 
where 𝜇𝑡−1 and 𝜎𝑡−1
2  are the conditional expected return and the conditional variance, 
respectively, of the WML portfolio for the next month and 𝜆 is a time-invariant scaling 
factor for the unconditional risk and return of the dynamic momentum portfolio. Daniel 
and Moskowitz (2016) regress the WML returns on a bear market indicator variable and 
on the preceding 6-month market variance, and use the interaction between the 
explanatory variables of the fitted regression as a proxy for the conditional expected 
mean return of the WML portfolio. The estimate for conditional variance is obtained 
from a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. 
 
Both Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) show that the 
risk-managed momentum portfolios perform considerably better than the plain 
momentum portfolios. Daniel and Moskowitz also show that the dynamic momentum 
strategy performs well in international markets and across different asset classes. While 
the model of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) keeps the volatility of the WML portfolio 
constant by scaling the portfolio leverage, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) allow the 
volatility to vary and scale the leverage based on the forecasted volatility and the mean 
return of the WML portfolio. Both models decrease leverage when the volatility is 
forecasted to be high and increase leverage when the volatility is forecasted to be low. 
The two models result in notably different strategies in terms of leverage and trading 
costs. As Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) note, the dynamic strategy requires significantly 
higher leverage but also negative portfolio weights at the times when the WML return is 
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expected to be negative. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) disclose that the scaling factor 
for their strategy varies between 0.13 and 2.00 during 1927–2011, while Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) report that the weights for their strategy vary between -0.60 and 5.37 
during 1927–2013. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) estimate the transaction costs to be 
similar for both constant volatility momentum and unscaled WML momentum, but 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) note that the transaction costs for their dynamic 
momentum strategy are higher than for the two other strategies.  
 
Geczy and Samonov (2016) confirm that during 1926–2012, the constant volatility of 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and the dynamic weights of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) 
yield higher monthly returns than equally-weighted cross-sectional momentum. 
However, Geczy and Samonov (2016) find that these risk-managed momentum 
strategies perform worse than non-managed strategy in the out-of-sample period of 
1802–1926. The results are not directly comparable as Geczy and Samonov need to 
estimate the standard deviation using 10-month rolling returns due to a lack of daily 
returns for the out-of-sample period.  
 
Moreira and Muir (2017) suggest a volatility-managed strategy that scales the monthly 
portfolio return by the inverse of the portfolio’s realized variance in the previous month. 
The volatility-managed strategy is not targeted to increase the performance of 
momentum only, but instead, Moreira and Muir test the strategy’s performance on 
multiple factors, including momentum, value and market portfolios. Moreira and Muir 
(2017, p. 1616) express the volatility-managed portfolio (𝑓𝑡+1
𝜎 ) in the following form: 
 
 𝑓𝑡+1
𝜎 =
𝑐
?̂?𝑡
2(𝑓)
𝑓𝑡+1,  (8) 
 
where 𝑓𝑡+1  is the excess return for factor 𝑓 ,  ?̂?𝑡
2(𝑓)  is the proxy for the factor’s 
conditional variance, and 𝑐 is a constant for controlling the factor’s exposure. Moreira 
and Muir set the constant so that both the volatility-managed and the non-managed 
factor have the same unconditional standard deviation. To simplify the construction of 
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the volatility-managed portfolio, Moreira and Muir (2017, p. 1616) use the preceding 
month’s realized variance (𝑅𝑉𝑡
2) as a proxy for the factor’s conditional variance: 
 
 ?̂?𝑡
2(𝑓) = 𝑅𝑉𝑡
2(𝑓) = ∑ (𝑓𝑡+𝑑 −
∑ 𝑓𝑡+𝑑
1
𝑑=1/22
22
)
2
1
𝑑=1/22 .  (9) 
 
Moreira and Muir (2017) regress the volatility-managed factors on the original factors to 
test if volatility timing increases Sharpe ratios. The regression alphas are positive and 
statistically significant for market, momentum, profitability, ROE, investment and BAB 
factors. The annualized alpha of the volatility-managed momentum factor, 12.51%, 
shows the superiority of risk-managed momentum over the non-managed factor and 
supports the findings of both Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2016).   
 
The advantages of volatility-management apply to the market factor as well. Moreira and 
Muir (2017) note that the positive alpha on the market factor implies that the volatility-
managed strategy expands the mean-variance frontier and offers a higher return on the 
same level of risk than the unmanaged market portfolio. To test the performance of 
volatility managed factors during recession periods, Moreira and Muir regress the scaled 
factor returns on the original factor returns and NBER recession dummies. The 
regression results show that the volatility-managed factors have a lower risk-exposure 
and therefore lower betas during recession periods. Moreira and Muir also consider 
using realized volatility and expected variance instead of the realized variance to scale 
the factor returns. The results are similar for both realized volatility and expected 
variance, but the advantage of these two strategies is a lower variation in the portfolio 
weights and reduced trading costs. 
 
Grobys et al. (2018) show that the volatility-scaling approach of Barroso and Santa-Clara 
(2015) increases the performance of industry momentum. Furthermore, Grobys et al. 
(2018) show that industry momentum portfolios do not exhibit optionality during bear 
markets like stock momentum portfolios do (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016). 
38 
Although the findings of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015), Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) 
and Moreira and Muir (2017) provide strong support for the benefits of risk management, 
Harvey et al. (2018) find somewhat mixed results, and Liu, Tang and Zhou (2019) find 
oppositely that volatility timing does not increase the performance of a market portfolio. 
Harvey et al. (2018) show that volatility scaling improves the performance of equity 
portfolios in terms of higher Sharpe ratios, but they also find that the benefits do not 
apply to currencies, commodities or portfolios that do not hold stocks. Harvey et al. note 
that while the volatility-managed market portfolio has a lower left tail risk, also the 
highest positive returns are reduced by volatility scaling.  
 
Liu et al. (2019) show that the volatility-timing strategy of Moreira and Muir (2017) 
suffers from look-ahead bias as the strategy uses the unconditional volatility of the whole 
sample period to scale the portfolio weights. Liu et al. (2019) find that even before 
correcting the look-ahead bias, the volatility-managed market portfolio outperforms the 
market index only during 2001–2017. After correcting the look-ahead bias of the 
volatility-timing strategy, they find that the strategy suffers drawdowns of 68%–93% in 
different specifications, making the strategy difficult to implement for the market 
portfolio. Furthermore, Liu et al. show that the volatility-target approach of Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015) does not outperform the market index during August 1936–
December 2017. Liu et al. (2019) also find that the approach is sensitive to different 
specifications of target volatility—increasing the target volatility from 12% to 20% does 
not significantly improve the Sharpe ratio, but it increases the maximum drawdown from 
52% to 76%. 
 
After having shown that the measures of risk management seem to increase the 
performance of momentum and factor portfolios but can negatively affect the 
performance of the market portfolio, it is motivated to test the performance of risk-
managed factor momentum.  
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3.3 Behavioral and risk-based explanations for momentum returns 
The momentum strategies discussed earlier seem to contradict the weak form of market 
efficiency—information of past returns and earnings can be used to predict future 
performance. The competing explanations for momentum returns are a higher 
systematic risk of momentum portfolios and behavioral biases that create short-term 
price continuation. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that the profitability of cross-
sectional momentum portfolios is not driven by their systematic risk, but instead 
investor behavior, namely underreaction on a short-term to new information. This 
theory is also supported by the behavioral models of Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999). Barberis et al. (1998) suggest that investors’ underreaction to new 
information causes stock returns to be positively autocorrelated in the short-term as the 
initially neglected information is incorporated slowly to market prices.  
 
Hong and Stein (1999) build their model of investors’ behavior on a theory of gradually 
spreading private information that initially causes investors to underreact to new 
information. Likewise, Chan et al. (1996) suggest that new information is incorporated 
into stock prices only gradually. They find that approximately 41% of 6-month price 
momentum returns take place around earnings announcement dates and that large 
earnings surprises are, on average, followed by subsequent surprises in the same 
direction. The slow response to new information is not limited to investors only, as Chan 
et al. discover that also analysts are slow to update their forecasts, especially for the 
worst-performing companies. 
 
Hong et al. (2000) find that firms with low analyst coverage experience higher 
momentum returns than firms with high analyst coverage, and the effect is stronger 
among past losers than past winners. Hong et al. interpret that the asymmetry in 
momentum returns means that stocks with low analyst coverage react slower to bad 
news than to good news. Similarly to Hong et al., also Chan (2003) finds market prices 
adjust slowly to bad news. Bad public news cause negative stock price drifts that last up 
to 12 months, suggesting that investors underreact to negative public information.  
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While Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) attempt to explain momentum 
returns with underreaction, Daniel et al. (1998) suggest that momentum is initially 
caused when investors overestimate the value of their private information and overreact 
to new information. Furthermore, the overreaction and momentum effect are later 
strengthened by self-attribution bias if new public information confirms the earlier 
private information. 
 
The relation between momentum and investor sentiment is studied by Antoniou, Doukas 
and Subrahmanyam (2013) and Hao, Chou, Ko and Yang (2018). Based on the model of 
Hong and Stein (1999), Antoniou et al. (2013) expect that investors’ underreaction to 
new information is more pronounced when the new information contradicts the 
prevailing investor sentiment. The findings of Antoniou et al. support their hypothesis 
that momentum returns are affected by investor sentiment—momentum returns are 
high and statistically significant during an optimistic investor sentiment, and 
insignificantly low during a pessimistic investor sentiment. Hao et al. (2018) find that the 
profitability of the 52-week high momentum is significantly higher following periods of 
high investor sentiment, and that the profitability is mainly driven by the 52-week high 
winner stocks that have positive earnings surprises and correspondingly by 52-week 
loser stocks that have negative earnings surprises. Hao et al. conclude that their findings 
support the hypothesis of George et al. (2004)—investors tend to anchor on the 52-week 
high price and underreact to extreme earnings announcements.  
 
The competing explanation for the profitability of momentum is that the returns to 
momentum portfolios are compensation for a higher risk, but commonly used asset 
pricing models without momentum factor cannot explain momentum returns. Fama and 
French (1996, 2016) find that momentum portfolios have significant alpha on three- and 
five-factor model regressions. Chan et al. (1996) show that the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993) is unable to explain the returns to portfolios that are formed on 
a combination of past returns and analyst forecast revisions.  
41 
Unlike the three- and five-factor models of Fama and French (1993, 2016), Daniel and 
Hirshleifer (2019) find that their three-factor model captures well the average returns of 
earnings, price and industry momentum portfolios. The returns of momentum portfolios 
are captured predominantly by the PEAD factor, which is intended to capture short-
horizon mispricing that stems from underreaction to earnings announcements. 
Furthermore, the short sides of momentum portfolios have negative and statistically 
significant loadings on the PEAD factor, while the long sides of momentum portfolios 
have significantly positive loadings on the PEAD factor. The loadings on short-side 
portfolios are higher in absolute terms than on long-side portfolios (i.e., asymmetric), 
suggesting that the mispricing is more pronounced for assets that are more difficult to 
arbitrage. Together the findings of Daniel and Hirshleifer suggest that momentum 
returns, like other robust factor returns, are driven by systematic mispricing. 
 
Because momentum returns cannot be explained by the commonly used market, size, 
value, investment or profitability proxies for risk, the risk-based explanations suggest 
that momentum portfolios have a time-varying risk exposure to either macroeconomic, 
stock-specific or industry-based risk-factors. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that 
the profitability of momentum strategies in the United States can be explained with a 
conditional model that uses lagged macroeconomic variables. The authors interpret that 
momentum returns are driven by cross-sectional variation in conditionally expected 
returns. Opposite to the results of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Griffin, Ji and Martin 
(2003) do not find any evidence that macroeconomic variables would explain 
international momentum returns.  Griffin et al. (2003) use the conditional model of 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and the unconditional model of Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986) to explain momentum returns of 17 countries, but do not find a statistically 
significant relation between country-specific factors and momentum returns.  
 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that cross-sectional variation in individual stocks’ 
unconditional mean returns explains the profitability of momentum strategies. Their 
explanation is based on the assumption that the mean returns of individual stocks are 
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stationary, and therefore the profitability of momentum strategies is not dependent on 
return predictability. Because momentum strategies buy stocks with high mean returns 
and sell stocks with low mean returns, the strategy is profitable on average when stock 
prices are expected to follow random walks. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that the 
negative post-holding period returns contradict the Conrad and Kaul (1998) hypothesis 
because it states that high mean return stocks should constantly outperform low mean 
return stocks. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) suggest that the positive autocorrelation of 
expected stock returns explains the profitability of momentum strategies, and that 
momentum returns are compensation for the predictable changes in firms’ systematic 
risk. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that momentum strategies are mainly driven 
by industry momentum, and because both winner and loser portfolios tend to hold 
stocks from the same industry, they suggest that momentum portfolios are not well 
diversified. According to Moskowitz and Grinblatt, the lack of diversification in 
momentum portfolios can explain why arbitrageurs are not able to eliminate momentum 
premium.  
 
The research evidence presented in this section suggests that momentum returns are 
driven by mispricing stemming from behavioral biases and that the mispricing is more 
pronounced during periods of high investor sentiment (Hao et al., 2018). The evidence 
suggests that behavioral biases cause underreaction, especially to earnings-related 
information (e.g., Chan, 2003), and limits to arbitrage can explain why momentum 
returns are persistent in the short-term but tend to reverse in the long-term.  
 
Even though the evidence on behavioral biases is compelling, momentum returns are 
likely, at least to some degree, compensation for a higher risk. Momentum returns 
cannot be explained by traditional asset pricing models, but instead, the mispricing 
factors of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) can explain momentum returns well. Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) show that U.S. momentum returns can be explained with 
macroeconomic risk factors, while international momentum returns cannot be explained 
with similar country-specific risk factors (Griffin et al., 2003). 
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4 Factor momentum 
Factor momentum is built on a finding that individual factors are positively 
autocorrelated. Instead of individual stocks, equities, indices or currencies, the strategy 
times investments in factors based on the factors’ recent performance. Arnott et al. 
(2018) implement cross-sectional factor momentum with 51 U.S. equity factors, while 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) study the performances of 
both cross-sectional and time-series factor momentum strategies with 65 and 20 factors, 
respectively. The study of Ehsani and Linnainmaa combines 14 U.S. equity factors and six 
global equity factors. Gupta and Kelly use U.S. equity factors, but they also show that 
their results are similar when implemented with 62 global equity factors. 
 
Analogously to other momentum strategies, time-series factor momentum buys factors 
with a positive trend and sells factors with a negative trend, whereas the cross-sectional 
strategy invests in factors based on the factors’ relative performance. Both Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) suggest that the time-series strategy 
works better for timing factors than the cross-sectional strategy. Gupta and Kelly show 
that individual factors are strongly autocorrelated, and for that reason, they suggest that 
the time-series strategy is a better measure of expected returns. They find that 49 factors 
have statistically significant and positive monthly first-order autocorrelation coefficients 
and that the average coefficient for all 65 factors is 0.11. In a similar vein, Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa (2019) suggest that the time-series strategy performs better because it only 
bets on positive autocorrelation in factor returns. In contrast, the cross-sectional 
strategy also bets that the factors have negative cross-covariances. 
 
Both Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) construct the time-series 
factor momentum portfolios similarly by taking a long position in factors with positive 
formation period returns and short position in factors with negative formation period 
returns. Furthermore, Gupta and Kelly (2019) construct the aggregate time-series factor 
momentum portfolio by scaling each factor by its annualized three-year volatility. Gupta 
and Kelly also scale the strategy’s total position in long and short sides so that the 
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strategy always has a unit leverage. Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) do not scale the 
positions in individual factors or the leverage in long and short sides. Their strategy is 
still a zero-investment strategy because the individual factors are long-short portfolios, 
but their strategy allows the leverage to be different between long and short sides.  
 
The construction of the cross-sectional factor momentum strategies also differs among 
the three studies. Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) both 
construct the cross-sectional strategies so that their strategies are long factors with 
above-median formation period returns and short factors with below-median formation 
period returns. Arnott et al. (2018) select an approach that is similar to other cross-
sectional momentum strategies, and take long and short positions in the best- and worst-
performing factors instead of trading all the included factors. Arnott et al. follow the 
methodology of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who buy and sell the top and bottom 
three industries out of 20 industries. With 51 factors in total, Arnott et al. (2018) sort the 
factors by formation period returns and take a long position in the top eight factors and 
short position in the bottom eight factors.  
 
Although Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) find that the time-
series factor momentum performs better than cross-sectional factor momentum, this 
finding might be driven by the construction of cross-sectional strategies which is 
different from Arnott et al. (2018) and other momentum strategies (e.g., Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993). By constructing the cross-sectional strategy so that it is short factors with 
below the median returns, the strategy is likely to short factors that have positive prior 
returns. Both Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) show that 
factors with positive prior returns are likely to continue having positive future returns. In 
contrast, Arnott et al. (2018) construct the strategy so that it is short only the bottom 
15% of all factors, and therefore, their strategy is less likely to short factors that continue 
to have positive returns. Studies on factor momentum have not yet compared the cross-
sectional strategy, as proposed by Arnott et al. (2018), against time-series factor 
momentum, and thus further research is warranted. 
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Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) use spanning regressions to show that the five-factor 
model of Fama and French (2015), together with time-series factor momentum as an 
explanatory variable, fully subsumes the UMD factor and the industry momentum of 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) among other momentum strategies. While factor 
momentum subsumes both industry momentum and price momentum, these strategies, 
together with the five-factor model, do not span factor momentum. Arnott et al. (2018) 
find similarly that cross-sectional factor momentum subsumes all specifications of 
industry momentum. Gupta and Kelly (2019) find that industry momentum or stock price 
momentum alone cannot explain the returns of factor momentum strategies that are 
formed using 1-month lagged returns. However, industry momentum and price 
momentum explain the returns to cross-sectional factor momentum strategies with a 
formation period longer than six months. 
 
The factor momentum strategy does not need a vast number of factors to be profitable. 
Arnott et al. (2018) find that randomly selected ten factors out of their study's 51 factors 
are enough to generate almost identical profits as the complete set of factors. 
Furthermore, they show that even market, size, value, investment and profitability 
factors of Fama and French (2015) are enough to implement the factor momentum 
strategy with an annualized return of 8.0%. Similarly, Gupta and Kelly (2019) point out 
that six factors are enough to replicate the factor momentum strategy of 65 factors.  
 
Arnott et al. (2018) find that none of the 51 factors decreases the performance of factor 
momentum. This finding can explain why even a small number of factors is enough for 
implementing a profitable momentum strategy. However, the factors’ relative 
contribution towards momentum profits varies significantly, and Arnott et al. note that 
the factors with the highest contribution do not have the highest average returns. Arnott 
et al. rank 51 factors based on their contribution to momentum profits, and form factor 
momentum strategies using the quintile ranks. The difference in annualized returns 
between the portfolios of ten best and ten worst factors is 9.3% and statistically 
significant.  
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Arnott et al. (2018) find cross-sectional factor momentum to have the most robust 
performance when both formation and holding periods are set as one month. This 
strategy generates an average annualized return of 10.49% with a t-statistic of 5.01. 
When the same strategy is adjusted for past industry returns, thus making it industry-
neutral, the annualized return drops to 6.41% with a t-statistic of 5.55. Gupta and Kelly 
(2019) find similarly that both time-series and cross-sectional factor momentum 
strategies generate the highest returns with one-month formation and holding periods. 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) show that the time-series strategy is more robust to 
longer holding periods than the cross-sectional factor momentum. Returns to the cross-
sectional strategy are statistically significant up to 6-month holding periods, while the 
time-series strategies generate statistically significant returns on formation and holding 
periods up to 24 months. In line with the results of the other two studies, Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa find that the cross-sectional factor momentum achieves the highest average 
returns with 1-month lagged returns. The time-series strategy generates slightly higher 
returns when the formation period is 1, 6 or 12 months and the holding period 1-month.  
 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) suggest that the autocorrelation of individual factors 
explains all momentum strategies—factor momentum times factors directly and other 
momentum strategies indirectly—and momentum strategies are on average profitable 
as long as the aggregate autocorrelation of individual factors is positive. Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa find that the returns to stock momentum strategies are correlated with 
factor autocorrelations and that the stock momentum crashes are concentrated to 
periods of negative factor autocorrelations. However, the studies on factor momentum 
do not explain unambiguously what ultimately drives the factor momentum returns. 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) find that factor momentum returns are affected by 
investor sentiment and suggest that factor momentum could be driven by mispricing. 
Arnott et al. (2018) suggest similarly that factor momentum and autocorrelation of 
factor returns might stem from mispricing. Gupta and Kelly (2019) do not consider the 
source of factor momentum returns. 
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5 Data and methodology 
The data used in this thesis consists of publicly available U.S. market data. AQR’s3 data 
library provides monthly return data for the BAB factor from December 1930 to 
December 2019 and for the QMJ factor from July 1957 to December 2019. Monthly 
return data for the HMLD factor spans from July 1926 to December 2019. Kenneth 
French’s4 data library provides monthly portfolio returns for asset growth, B/M, CF/P, D/P, 
E/P, momentum, operating profitability and short-term reversals from July 1963 to 
December 2019. The risk-free rate and market return data are also obtained from 
French’s data library. The overall sample period for all 11 factors is July 1963–December 
2019. Both AQR and French form the portfolios using all stocks traded in the NYSE and 
Nasdaq.  
 
Table 1 lists the 11 factors that are used to form the factor momentum strategies. The 
table also provides an abbreviation for each factor together with the initial study in 
academic literature.  
 
Table 1. Included equity factors and their first appearance in academic literature. 
Factor Abbreviation Original Study 
Asset growth ASSETG Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) 
Betting against beta BAB Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
Book-to-market BM Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) 
Cash flow-to-price CFP Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
Dividend yield DP Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) 
Earnings-to-price EP Basu (1983) 
High minus low (devil) HMLD Asness and Frazzini (2013) 
Operating profitability OP Novy-Marx (2013) 
Quality minus junk QMJ Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2019) 
Short-term reversals STR Jegadeesh (1990) 
Momentum UMD Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
 
3 https://www.aqr.com/insights/datasets 
4 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research 
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Asset growth, operating profitability and quality minus junk factors are based on 
accounting information only, and the betting against beta is based on stock market 
information only. Book-to-market, cashflow-to-price, dividend yield, earnings-to-price 
and high-minus-low devil are based on a ratio of accounting information to market price. 
The momentum factor is based on prior returns from month t-12 to month t-2, skipping 
one month before the holding period, and short-term reversal factor is based on the 
returns of month t-1. 
 
I use the orthogonalized investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) as a proxy 
for investor sentiment. The complete data for investor sentiment index is available from 
July 1965 to December 2018 from Wurgler’s website.5 The investor sentiment index is 
based on five sentiment proxies, and unlike in Baker and Wurgler (2006), the most recent 
dataset does not include the NYSE turnover as a proxy for investor sentiment. The five 
proxies are discount on closed-end funds, dividend premium, equity share in new equity 
issues, number of IPOs and the average first-day returns on IPOs. The orthogonalized 
investor sentiment index is obtained by regressing each proxy on growth in industrial 
production, growth in consumer durables, nondurables and services, and on NBER 
recession dummy variable.  
 
Figure 1 plots the month-end values of the investor sentiment index from July 1965 to 
December 2018. The shaded areas represent the NBER recession periods, and the 
dashed lines mark the 30th and 70th quantiles. Due to the construction of the index, it 
has a zero mean and unit variance (Baker & Wurgler, 2006). Aligning the investor 
sentiment index with recession periods shows that sharp peaks in the investor sentiment 
index are followed by recession periods and sharply declining investor sentiment. The 
index reaches the maximum value of 3.20 twice; in December 1969 just before the 
recession period, and at the end of February 2001, a month before the recession period. 
The investor sentiment index from 2012 onwards has been less volatile than in the past, 
ranging between -0.28 and 0.18.  
 
5 http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ 
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Figure 1. Investor sentiment index from July 1965 to December 2018. 
The data for the volatility index (VIX) is available from January 1990 to December 2019 
from the CBOE.6 VIX measures the 30-day option implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index, 
and the expected volatility is quoted in annualized percentage form (Cboe, 2019). Figure 
2 plots the month-end values of VIX from January 1990 to December 2019 along with 
the NBER recession periods, as reported in Wurgler’s investor sentiment dataset. The 
average value of VIX is 19.14 using daily closing values, and 19.18 using month-end 
values. The maximum and minimum values of VIX for the period are 81.84 and 8.56, and 
with month-end values 59.89 and 9.51, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2. Month-end values of VIX from January 1990 to December 2019. 
 
 
6 http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/vix-options-and-futures/vix-index/vix-historical-data  
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5.1 Methodology 
I use the five-factor model of Fama and French  (2015, FF5) to assess the performance 
of each factor portfolio and factor momentum strategy. The return series to factor or 
strategy 𝑅𝑖 are regressed on the market, size, value, profitability and investment factors 
in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖. (10) 
 
I also test whether the six-factor model of Fama and French (2018, FF6) increases 
explanatory power on factor momentum returns over the five-factor model. The factor 
momentum returns are regressed on the FF6 factors in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 +  𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖, (11) 
 
where UMD is the same momentum factor that is used to construct the factor 
momentum portfolios. Because Arnott et al. (2018) show that the FF6 model is not able 
to completely explain factor momentum returns in their tests, I also regress the factor 
momentum returns against the three-factor model of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019, DH3). 
The model uses market, financing and post-earnings announcement drift factors to 
explain mispricing anomalies. The monthly return data for FIN and PEAD factors is 
obtained from Daniel’s web site7 and spans from July 1972 to December 2018. I repeat 
the FF5 and FF6 model regressions for the shorter sample period to allow comparability 
between the models. I follow the methodology of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) and use 
the same MKT factor as in the FF5 and FF6 models. The factor momentum returns are 
regressed on the DH3 model in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑐𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝑑𝑖𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐷+𝜀𝑖 .  (12) 
 
 
7 http://www.kentdaniel.net/data.php 
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Using the DH3 model to assess the performance of factor momentum strategies helps 
to understand whether the factor momentum returns are driven by mispricing as 
suggested by Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019). Based on the asset pricing tests of Daniel 
and Hirshleifer (2019), I expect to find that the DH3 model increases explanatory power 
on factor momentum returns over the FF5 and FF6 models. To the extent that factor 
momentum returns stem from mispricing, a significant exposure on the PEAD factor 
suggest that investors underreact to earnings-related information. Following the 
interpretation of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019), overpriced portfolios should have 
negative loadings on the FIN and PEAD factors, and underpriced portfolios should have 
positive loadings. I use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method to compute 
the regression estimates throughout this study. Since the individual factor returns are 
autocorrelated, I use the Newey and West (1987) standard errors to calculate the t-
statistics.  
 
To test whether the factor and factor momentum returns are affected by the prevailing 
investor sentiment, I follow the methodologies of Hao et al. (2018) and Antoniou et al. 
(2013) and regress the return series on investor sentiment dummy variables. Dummy 
variable HIGHt (LOWt) equals to one when the value of investor sentiment index at the 
end of month t-1 belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of all observations, and zero 
otherwise. Dummy variable MILDt is equal to one when the investor sentiment index is 
above the bottom 30% but below the top 30%, and zero otherwise. The value of investor 
sentiment index at month t measures the investor sentiment at the end of the month, 
and therefore using the lagged value of investor sentiment gives the contemporaneous 
value of investor sentiment at the beginning of month t. Hao et al. (2018) and Antoniou 
et al. (2013) use a weighted three-month rolling average of investor sentiment index to 
assess the level of investor sentiment at the end of the formation period. Because the 
three-month average can level off sharp changes in the investor sentiment index, I use 
the raw month-end values of investor sentiment index. The results are similar (not 
reported) using the three-month rolling average. 
52 
To test whether the average factor returns are significantly different from zero in the 
month following high, mild and low investor sentiment, the factor returns are regressed 
on sentiment dummy variables without a constant in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α1HIGH𝑡 + α2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑡 + α3𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, (13) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the return to factor i in month t, and 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 are the coefficient 
estimates on dummy variables HIGHt, MILDt and LOWt  (Hao et al., 2018). The coefficient 
estimates capture the average factor returns following each investor sentiment. To test 
whether the average factor returns in high sentiment periods are statistically different 
from returns in low sentiment periods, the monthly factor returns are regressed on 
dummy variables HIGHt and MILDt with a constant (𝛼0) in the following form: 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + α1HIGH𝑡 + α2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, (14) 
 
where the estimate of 𝛼1 measures the difference in average returns between periods 
of high and low investor sentiment (Hao et al., 2018). As a robustness check, I use the 
above and below median values of the investor sentiment index as in Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa (2019) and Stambaugh et al. (2012). Dummy variable ABOVEt (BELOWt) 
equals one when the investor sentiment is above (below) the median at the end of 
month t-1, and zero otherwise. The methodology is otherwise the same as above, and 
the corresponding regression for testing whether the factor momentum returns are 
significantly different from zero is defined as: 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α1ABOVE𝑡 + α2𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 . (15) 
 
To test whether the difference in average returns between above and below the median 
investor sentiment states is statistically significant, the returns are regressed in the 
following model:  
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α0 + α1ABOVE𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. (16) 
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To test the performance of risk-managed factor momentum, I adapt the methodology of 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) to scale the factor momentum returns. Instead of 
forecasting the next-month variance from past returns, I use the option-implied volatility 
of the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the expected market volatility. Using VIX instead of 
realized volatility is justified for both practical and statistical purposes. As Grobys (2019) 
notes, the information of VIX is easily available to an investor, unlike the measure of 
realized volatility. Since factor momentum portfolios are frequently rebalanced and 
trade factors that have low pairwise correlations, the strategy is likely to trade stocks 
with completely opposite characteristics over time. Realized portfolio volatility is likely 
to generate a more arbitrary estimate of expected volatility while option-implied market 
volatility is likely to provide a more uniform measure of expected volatility. 
 
I use the one-month lagged month-end values of VIX to get the measure of expected 
market volatility at the time of the portfolio formation. By revising the model of Barroso 
and Santa-Clara (2015, p. 115), the return for risk-managed factor momentum portfolio 
(WML*) is obtained by scaling the WML portfolio return with the ratio of targeted market 
volatility to lagged month-end value of VIX in the following form: 
 
 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡 =
20%
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 . (17) 
 
Instead of using an annualized target volatility of 12% like Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) 
do, I choose the target volatility so that it corresponds to the long-term average value of 
VIX. The average value of VIX using month-end values is 19.18, and I set the target 
volatility to 20%. The scaling does not result in portfolios that would have the target 
volatility, but instead, the risk-managed portfolios have a constant exposure to the 
market portfolio in relation to the expected market volatility. The purpose of using 
varying portfolio weights is to have a lower exposure to the market risk when the market 
volatility is expected to be high and a higher exposure to the market risk when the 
expected market volatility is low. This methodology is also closely related to the 
methodology of Moreira and Muir (2017). 
54 
5.2 Factor construction and factor returns 
The factor construction follows the methodology of Fama and French (1996) for 
constructing SMB and HML factors. I calculate the monthly return for each factor from 
four value-weighted portfolios that are sorted on size and factor variable. AQR constructs 
the portfolios by sorting all included stocks first on size and then on the factor, while 
French sorts simultaneously on size and factor. Both AQR and French use the median 
NYSE market capitalization as a size breakpoint. Similarly, the high and low portfolio 
breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles corresponding to the factor. The size 
and factor breakpoints are updated when the portfolios are constructed or rebalanced.  
The return for factor i in month t is the average return of two portfolios consisting of 
stocks ranked above the 70th percentile minus the average return of two portfolios 
consisting of stocks ranked below the 30th percentile. The factors are constructed so 
that the expected sign of the monthly return is positive. For example, the return for 
ASSETG is obtained by subtracting the average return of small and big firms with high 
asset growth from the average return of small and big firms with low asset growth: 
 
 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝐺𝑡 =
1
2
(𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 & 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑣 + 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑔 & 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑣) −
1
2
(𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 & 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑣 + 𝑟𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑔 & 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑣). (18) 
 
I use the BAB and HMLD factor returns as reported by AQR and calculate the monthly 
returns for the remaining nine factors using the portfolio data of AQR and French. The 
construction of the BAB factor differs from the other factors as it does not control for 
size. A more detailed description of the factor construction is available in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the 11 factors. The overall sample period spans 
from July 1963 to December 2019, and each factor has 678 observations. Reported are 
the average returns (?̅?), standard deviations of the monthly returns (SD), the highest 
(Max) and lowest (Min) monthly returns, the skewness and the kurtosis of the return 
series. The reported t-statistic, 𝑡(?̅?) , tests whether the factor’s average return is 
statistically different from zero.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics for long-short factors. 
Factor ?̅?  SD 𝑡(?̅?) Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
EW Average 0.37 % 1.45 % (6.57) 10.6 % -8.5 % 0.33 9.96 
ASSETG 0.27 % 1.99 % (3.58) 9.6 % -6.9 % 0.31 4.62 
BAB 0.82 % 3.25 % (6.55) 15.4 % -15.6 % -0.48 7.48 
BM 0.31 % 2.81 % (2.83) 12.9 % -11.2 % 0.10 5.02 
CFP 0.28 % 2.50 % (2.95) 11.4 % -12.0 % -0.11 5.57 
DP 0.01 % 2.81 % (0.07) 10.6 % -11.5 % -0.05 4.33 
EP 0.29 % 2.57 % (2.96) 9.6 % -13.0 % -0.04 5.37 
HMLD 0.26 % 3.40 % (2.02) 27.0 % -18.0 % 0.89 11.63 
OP 0.26 % 2.16 % (3.13) 13.3 % -18.3 % -0.31 15.44 
QMJ 0.38 % 2.23 % (4.47) 12.4 % -9.1 % 0.22 5.89 
STR 0.49 % 3.07 % (4.20) 16.2 % -14.6 % 0.38 8.72 
UMD 0.65 % 4.19 % (4.01) 18.4 % -34.4 % -1.30 13.35 
 
Ten of the factors generate highly significant average returns that are similar in 
magnitude as in earlier studies. The dividend yield is the only factor that fails to generate 
statistically or economically significant returns, and this finding is consistent with the 
out-of-sample replication study of Hou et al. (2018). Including the dividend yield is still 
justified, as Arnott et al. (2018) find that an individual factor does not decrease the 
performance of the factor momentum portfolio. The first row of Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics for a portfolio that invests equally in all 11 factors. The equal-
weighted portfolio has a significant monthly average return of 0.37% and notably lower 
standard deviation than any of the 11 factors, indicating that the factor returns have low 
or negative correlations. Annualized return and volatility for the equal-weighted 
portfolio are 4.53% and 5.02%, respectively. In comparison, the market portfolio has an 
annualized average return of 6.69%, with a standard deviation of 15.18% after 
subtracting the risk-free return from the market return. 
 
BAB has the highest monthly average return (0.82%) and UMD the second highest 
(0.65%). The annualized returns for BAB and UMD factors are 10.25% and 8.02%, 
respectively. Both UMD and HMLD exhibit strong variation in average returns, 
momentum having highly negative skewness of -1.30, and HMLD having a positive 
skewness of 0.89. The standard deviations of monthly factor returns vary from 1.99% to 
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4.19%, and from 6.89% to 14.51% in annualized terms. The returns of the BAB may be 
driven by small-capitalization stocks like Novy-Marx and Velikov (2019) suggest. The 
other ten factors control for size bias by grouping stocks into two portfolios using the 
median NYSE market equity as a breakpoint, and by using value-weighted portfolio 
returns instead of equal-weighted. To control for possible micro-cap bias arising from the 
BAB factor, I test the robustness of factor momentum returns separately for small and 
large universes and without the BAB and HMLD factors in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations for the 11 factors. Over half of all factor pairs 
have a correlation lower than 0.25, which is consistent with Gupta and Kelly (2019), who 
find similar results with 65 factors. This finding suggests that even a relatively low 
number of factors allow capturing different return patterns, even though five out of 
eleven factors are based on measures of value. The pairwise correlations among value 
factors are high, but interestingly the BM factor shows a higher correlation with CFP and 
EP than with HMLD. Even though both BM and HMLD are based on a ratio of book-to-
market, the differences in rebalancing frequency and in how the market value is being 
measured result in different types of return behavior. Table 2 shows that the BM factor 
has higher average returns with lower volatility than the HMLD factor. 
 
Table 3. Factor return correlations. 
  ASSETG BAB BM CFP DP EP HMLD OP QMJ STR UMD 
ASSETG  1.00 
          
BAB  0.32 1.00 
         
BM  0.69 0.33 1.00 
        
CFP  0.62 0.37 0.85 1.00 
       
DP  0.61 0.22 0.66 0.65 1.00 
      
EP  0.57 0.36 0.87 0.91 0.69 1.00 
     
HMLD  0.53 0.13 0.78 0.69 0.62 0.70 1.00 
    
OP  -0.03 0.31 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.20 -0.07 1.00 
   
QMJ  0.07 0.21 -0.05 0.06 0.18 0.08 -0.25 0.72 1.00 
  
STR  -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.23 -0.09 -0.27 1.00 
 
UMD  -0.03 0.18 -0.20 -0.13 -0.20 -0.17 -0.65 0.11 0.28 -0.30 1.00 
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The correlation between UMD and HMLD is highly negative (-0.65). Similarly, the 
correlation coefficients between momentum and other measures of value are also 
negative but less so. These findings are consistent with Asness et al. (2013), who find that 
the correlation between momentum and value is more negative when the value is 
measured using contemporaneous market prices instead of 6 to 18 months lagged prices. 
The negative correlation between momentum and value can also be observed by 
examining the highest and lowest monthly returns. The highest monthly return for HMLD 
and the lowest return for UMD both occurred at the same time in April 2009. The 
opposite is true in February 2000, when UMD generates the highest monthly return of 
18.36% and HMLD the lowest monthly return of 17.98%. STR is the least correlated with 
other factors, having only a slightly positive correlation with HMLD, and a slightly negative 
correlation with QMJ and UMD.  
 
To test whether the past factor returns have predictive power on future returns, I regress 
the monthly factor returns conditional on their past 1- and 12-month return. I follow the 
methodology of Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and use the following time-series 
regressions: 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α + βD12,    𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α + βD1, (19a, 19b) 
  
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the return to factor i in month t, and 𝐷12 is a dummy variable that 
equals to one when the factor’s average return from month t-12 to t-1 is positive, and 
zero otherwise. The dummy variable 𝐷1 equals one when the return in the prior month 
is positive and zero otherwise. The intercept term 𝛼  in (19a) captures the average 
returns after the prior 12-month return is negative, and the slope coefficient 𝛽 measures 
the difference in average returns after positive and negative prior 12-month returns 
(Ehsani & Linnainmaa, 2019). The interpretations are similar for (19b), where the 
intercept term captures the average return following a month with a negative return, 
and the slope coefficient captures the difference in average returns following a positive 
and negative month.  
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Table 4 presents the OLS regression estimates for each factor conditional on the factor’s 
prior 12- and 1-month returns. On average, the factors earn positive returns after 12 
months of underperformance. The average return to the UMD is significantly positive 
following periods of negative 12-month returns (0.72%), and higher than the average 
return after a positive 12-month performance (0.62%). The equal-weighted portfolio 
that invests in all factors earns an average return of 0.10 % in the month following a 
negative 12-month period and 0.43% after a positive 12-month period. 
 
Table 4. Factor returns conditional on prior 12- and 1-month returns. 
 
Conditional on prior  
12-month return (19a)  
Conditional on prior 
1-month return (19b) 
  Intercept  Slope  Intercept  Slope 
Factor ?̂? 𝑡(?̂?)  ?̂? 𝑡(?̂?)  ?̂? 𝑡(?̂?)  ?̂? 𝑡(?̂?) 
Average 0.10 (0.75)  0.33 (2.26)  0.17 (1.92)  0.32 (2.83 
ASSETG 0.12 (0.99)  0.25 (1.56)  -0.01 (-0.10)  0.55 (3.60) 
BAB -0.22 (-0.63)  1.32 (3.53)  0.14 (0.67)  1.03 (3.95) 
BM 0.05 (0.27)  0.39 (1.70)  -0.10 (-0.61)  0.75 (3.48) 
CFP 0.13 (0.78)  0.24 (1.17)  -0.03 (-0.21)  0.57 (2.96) 
DP 0.00 (-0.05)  0.00 (0.11)  -0.44 (-2.95)  0.91 (4.27) 
EP 0.10 (0.63)  0.30 (1.45)  -0.08 (-0.55)  0.68 (3.48) 
HMLD -0.17 (-0.68)  0.73 (2.53)  -0.25 (-1.36)  1.01 (3.92) 
OP 0.03 (0.19)  0.35 (1.71)  -0.09 (-0.69)  0.62 (3.74) 
QMJ 0.09 (0.65)  0.43 (2.51)  0.01 (0.05)  0.68 (3.95) 
STR 0.49 (1.43)  0.01 (0.03)  0.56 (3.10)  -0.11 (-0.45) 
UMD 0.72 (2.70)  -0.10 (-0.29)  0.38 (1.44)  0.43 (1.28) 
 
Following a month of underperformance, the average returns are positive for four 
factors and negative for seven factors. The returns following a month of 
underperformance are significantly positive for STR and significantly negative for DP. The 
average return to the STR is higher after a negative month (0.56%) than it is after a 
positive month (0.45%). For every strategy, except for the STR, the average returns after 
a positive month are higher than the unconditional average returns (Table 2). The equal-
weighted portfolio earns an average return of 0.17% after a negative month and 0.49% 
after a positive month. 
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The regression results suggest that factor returns are highly persistent, and on average 
higher following periods of positive returns than they are after negative-return periods. 
To further examine the predictive power of past factor returns, I estimate the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients for each factor using the Q-test of Ljung and Box (1978). 
Table 5 reports the AC (1) estimates together with the Q-statistics and corresponding 
probabilities. The first-order autocorrelation coefficients are highly positive and 
statistically significant at a 1% level for nine factors. The results support the earlier 
finding that past factor returns can be used to predict future performance. 
 
Table 5. First-order autocorrelation coefficients for factor returns.  
  ASSETG BAB BM CFP DP EP HMLD OP QMJ STR UMD 
AC (1) 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 -0.03 0.05 
Q-stat 9.53 11.29 17.47 8.04 15.73 13.09 16.90 18.72 20.60 0.50 1.52 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.22 
 
Table 6 reports the five-factor model regression results with the corresponding t-
statistics for seven factors. Excluded are ASSETG, BM, HMLD and OP factors as these 
factors are included in the five-factor model. The alphas are statistically significant for 
BAB, QMJ, STR and UMD. The five-factor alphas on CFP, DP and EP are indistinguishable 
from zero as the HML factor captures the average returns of these factors. 
 
Table 6. FF5 model regressions for seven long-short factors. 
 BAB CFP DP EP QMJ STR UMD 
Alpha 0.424 0.038 0.027 0.069 0.379 0.383 0.713  
(2.82) (0.75) (0.35) (1.38) (7.13) (2.76) (3.45) 
MKT-RF 0.072 -0.041 -0.235 -0.044 -0.181 0.178 -0.143  
(1.36) (-2.95) (-11.44) (-3.07) (-11.27) (4.06) (-2.02) 
SMB 0.129 -0.009 -0.178 -0.039 -0.133 0.083 0.059 
  (2.28) (-0.41) (-5.58) (-1.69) (-6.30) (1.36) (0.55) 
HML 0.166 0.704 0.494 0.814 -0.213 0.182 -0.534 
  (1.55) (15.65) (7.67) (20.17) (-5.80) (1.97) (-3.30) 
RMW 0.562 0.156 -0.162 0.128 0.619 -0.028 0.231 
  (5.71) (4.46) (-2.91) (3.71) (13.06) (-0.18) (1.05) 
CMA 0.468 0.050 0.146 -0.095 0.136 -0.190 0.362 
  (3.12) (1.06) (1.88) (-1.88) (2.96) (-1.47) (1.50) 
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Stambaugh et al. (2012) find that the average long-short factor returns are higher after 
periods of high investor sentiment and that the factors’ short-side returns are 
significantly lower following periods of high investor sentiment. They also find that the 
long-side returns are not significantly affected by the investor sentiment. Stambaugh et 
al. hypothesize that investor sentiment is asymmetrically related to mispricing—high 
investor sentiment causes more overpricing than low investor sentiment causes 
underpricing due to short-sale limitations. Baker and Wurgler (2007) hypothesize that 
speculative stocks should be overvalued in high sentiment and undervalued in low 
sentiment. They find that the returns to speculative stocks are lower following months 
of high sentiment and higher following periods of low sentiment, thus supporting their 
hypothesis. They also hypothesize that the valuation of bond-like stocks is less affected 
by the investor sentiment, and the correlation between investor sentiment and valuation 
of bond-like stocks could also be negative if investors prefer quality in low sentiment.  
 
I expect to find a positive relation between long-short factor returns and investor 
sentiment, and a negative relation between short-side returns and investor sentiment, 
similarly to Stambaugh et al. (2012). To the extent that the factors reflect mispricing, 
overpricing should be more pronounced following periods of high investor sentiment, 
and underpricing should be more pronounced following periods of low investor 
sentiment. If the investor sentiment affects the returns symmetrically, unlike what 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) find, then both long- and short-side returns should be higher 
following periods of low investor sentiment than they are following periods of high 
investor sentiment.  Drawing on the hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler (2007), I also 
expect that the short-side returns are more affected by the investor sentiment than long-
side returns in both high and low sentiment states. To test how the factor returns are 
affected by the prevailing investor sentiment, I regress the long-short factor returns on 
dummy variables HIGH, MILD and LOW that measure the investor sentiment at the 
beginning of the investment period. I repeat the same regressions separately for long- 
and short-side portfolios to test the hypothesis that short-side portfolios have lower 
average returns after periods of high investor sentiment.  
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Table 7 presents the OLS regression estimates α̂1, α̂2 and α̂3 for dummy variables HIGH, 
MILD and LOW as in (13) with the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. Panel A 
reports the estimates for long-short portfolios, Panel B for long portfolios and Panel C 
for short portfolios. Factors HMLD and BAB do not have data separately for long and short 
portfolios, and therefore these factors are excluded from Panels B and C. The difference 
in average returns between high and low investor sentiments, the estimate of  α1 in (13), 
is reported at the bottom of each panel with the corresponding t-statistic. The t-statistics 
are calculated using the robust standard errors of Newey and West (1987). Because the 
data for the investor sentiment index is available from August 1965 to December 2018, 
the sample period is shorter than the full sample period. Dummy variables HIGH and 
LOW have both 192 observations, and dummy variable MILD has 257 observations.  
 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the average long-short factor returns are higher following 
periods of high investor sentiment than they are following periods of low investor 
sentiment. The difference in average returns is positive for 9 out of 11 factors and 
statistically significant at 5% level for five factors. Furthermore, the factor returns 
following high investor sentiment exceed the unconditional average returns. In contrast, 
the long-short factor returns following low investor sentiment are generally below the 
unconditional average returns, suggesting that mispricing is less pronounced after 
periods of low investor sentiment. This finding that long-short factors are, on average, 
more profitable after high investor sentiment is in line with expected results and the 
results of Stambaugh et al. (2012). 
 
The long- and short-side returns of all factors, except DP, are higher following periods of 
low investor sentiment than they are following high investor sentiment. The differences 
between high and low sentiment states are generally smaller for long-side portfolios 
than they are for short-side portfolios. However, the differences in long-side returns are 
not statistically significant, and only three of the short-side portfolios have significantly 
different returns between high and low sentiment. All factors, except QMJ, have 
statistically significant long-side returns in all investor sentiment states. These results 
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show that the performance of long-short factors is mainly driven by the short-side 
portfolios that are more affected by the prevailing investor sentiment. All factors have 
negative relation between short-side returns and investor sentiment as expected. The 
long-side returns are not significantly affected by investor sentiment. These findings are 
also consistent with the results of  Stambaugh et al. (2012). 
 
Table 7. Factor returns conditional on investor sentiment. 
Panel A – Factor returns (Long - Short) 
 
ASSETG BAB BM CFP DP EP HMLD OP QMJ STR UMD 
HIGH 0.651 1.408 0.818 0.586 0.494 0.832 0.666 0.707 0.830 0.637 0.681 
  (3.33) (4.29) (3.33) (2.65) (2.35) (3.37) (2.66) (3.55) (5.03) (3.30) (2.90) 
  MILD 0.045 0.716 -0.043 0.034 -0.166 -0.014 -0.379 0.174 0.508 -0.045 0.933  
(0.40) (2.53) (-0.23) (0.22) (-0.93) (-0.09) (-1.73) (1.28) (3.22) (-0.27) (3.79) 
  LOW 0.247 0.475 0.285 0.318 -0.215 0.176 0.763 -0.047 -0.151 1.001 0.302  
(1.53) (2.36) (1.39) (1.72) (-0.93) (0.97) (2.74) (-0.35) (-0.96) (5.00) (0.74) 
  HIGH - 0.404 0.933 0.533 0.267 0.710 0.656 -0.097 0.754 0.981 -0.364 0.378 
  LOW (1.59) (2.38) (1.67) (0.93) (2.27) (2.13) (-0.26) (3.12) (4.28) (-1.30) (0.80) 
Panel B – Long-side returns  
ASSETG 
 
BM CFP DP EP 
 
OP QMJ STR UMD 
  HIGH 0.992  1.197 1.156 1.327 1.343  0.992 0.435 0.922 0.996  
(3.25) (3.77) (3.77) (4.84) (4.16) (2.97) (1.34) (2.34) (2.72) 
  MILD 0.985  0.941 1.000 0.792 0.952  1.008 0.782 0.845 1.333 
   (3.07) (2.85) (3.21) (3.22) (3.06) (3.31) (2.83) (2.13) (3.88) 
  LOW 1.566  1.564 1.589 1.154 1.506  1.389 0.930 1.991 1.677 
  (3.92) (3.75) (4.09) (3.47) (3.64) (3.35) (2.39) (4.48) (4.13) 
  HIGH - -0.574  -0.368 -0.433 0.173 -0.163  -0.397 -0.496 -1.069 -0.680 
  LOW (-1.13) (-0.70) (-0.87) (0.40) (-0.31) (-0.74) (-0.97) (-1.78) (-1.24) 
Panel C – Short-side returns  
ASSETG 
 
BM CFP DP EP 
 
OP QMJ STR UMD 
  HIGH 0.341  0.378 0.570 0.832 0.511  0.284 -0.395 0.285 0.316 
  (0.85) (0.98) (1.55) (2.37) (1.40) (0.73) (-0.94) (0.82) (0.83) 
  MILD 0.940  0.983 0.966 0.957 0.966  0.834 0.273 0.890 0.400 
   (2.73) (2.95) (3.02) (2.92) (2.98) (2.26) (0.68) (2.82) (1.01) 
  LOW 1.318  1.279 1.271 1.369 1.330  1.436 1.081 0.990 1.374 
  (2.94) (2.98) (2.93) (3.18) (3.08) (3.39) (2.21) (2.35) (2.39) 
  HIGH - -0.977  -0.901 -0.701 -0.537 -0.819  -1.151 -1.476 -0.705 -1.059 
  LOW (-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.22) (-0.96) (-1.44) (-1.97) (-2.27) (-1.28) (-1.52) 
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5.3 Factor momentum portfolios 
The factor momentum portfolios are formed using L-month lagged factor returns and 
held for H months, and each factor momentum portfolio is denoted with an L-H pair. I 
test the performance of cross-sectional (CS) 1-1, 6-1, 6-6, 11-1 and 12-1 strategies and 
time-series (TS) 1-1, 6-1 and 12-1 strategies. Both CS and TS strategies are rebalanced 
monthly at the end of the formation period. The cross-sectional factor momentum 
portfolios are long two factors with the highest formation period returns and short two 
factors with the lowest formation period returns. Taking a long (short) position in two 
factors follows the allocation ratio of Arnott et al. (2018) when the total number of 
included factors is 11.8 In contrast, the cross-sectional factor momentum strategies of 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) are long factors with above-
median returns and short factors with below-median returns. I follow the approach of 
Arnott et al. (2018) because previous studies have not compared the cross-sectional 
factor momentum against the time-series strategy in the form that momentum 
strategies are commonly constructed.  
 
The 12-1 strategy is formed using the factor returns from month t-12 to t-1. The 11-1 is 
formed using the average returns from t-12 to t-2 and skipping the month t-1 before the 
holding month t. The 11-1 strategy is included to test how the performance is affected 
by skipping a month before the holding period. The returns to cross-sectional strategies 
are calculated as the spreads between long and short portfolios. The return to each long 
(short) portfolio in month t is calculated as the equal-weighted average return of the two 
factors with the highest (lowest) formation period returns. Since the 6-6 strategy 
includes overlapping holding periods, I follow the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and calculate the strategy’s long and short returns with 1/6 weight in each 
portfolio formed at times t-6 to t-1. 
 
8  The number of long and short factors is calculated as a ratio from the total number of factors by: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (
3
20
 𝑋 11) , 1} = 2, as in Arnott et al. (2018).  
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The time-series factor momentum strategies are long factors with positive formation 
period returns and short factors with negative formation period returns. The return to 
each long (short) portfolio in month t is calculated as the equal-weighted average return 
of factors with positive (negative) formation period returns. Because the number of 
factors in long and short portfolios varies from month to month, using equal-weighted 
average returns is equivalent to a zero-investment strategy that always has an equally 
large position in long and short portfolios. For example, if the time-series factor 
momentum strategy is long ten factors and short one factor, the weight on each long 
factor corresponds to 1/10 of the weight on the short position. 
 
Both cross-sectional and time-series factor momentum strategies are zero-cost 
portfolios. The cross-sectional strategies are always long two factors and short two 
factors, while the time-series strategies have either a long or short position in each factor.  
The fact that each of the 11 factors is a long-short portfolio has two important 
implications. First, a factor momentum investor earns momentum premium regardless 
of which side of the factor earns on average higher returns—as long as the monthly 
returns are positively autocorrelated. This feature of factor momentum is emphasized 
by Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019). For example, a long position in the QMJ factor denotes 
a long position in quality stocks, which is financed by a short position in junk stocks. 
Oppositely, a short position in the QMJ factor means taking a long position in the junk 
stocks and financing the purchase with a short position in quality stocks. Factor 
momentum strategy can, therefore, be interpreted as a strategy that bets on (against) 
the factors when they have relatively high (low) or positive (negative) prior returns.   
 
Second, the long and short sides of the factor momentum strategy are not pure long and 
short portfolios, but instead zero-cost portfolios. Both long- and short-side portfolios 
have equal long and short positions in the underlying factors, and therefore, both long- 
and short-side portfolios are zero-cost portfolios. For consistency, I refer to long (short)-
side portfolios as the winner (loser)-factor portfolios and report the WML factor 
momentum returns as the spreads between the winner- and loser-factor portfolios. 
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6 Results 
Table 8 presents the summary statistics for cross-sectional (CS) and time-series (TS) 
factor momentum strategies that are formed on past 1-, 6- and 12-month factor returns, 
and rebalanced monthly. The cross-sectional strategies are long two factors with the 
highest formation period returns and short two factors with the lowest formation period 
returns. The time-series strategies are long factors with positive formation period 
returns and short factors with negative formation period returns. The CS 11-1 strategy is 
formed using factor returns from t-12 to t-2, skipping the month t-1 before portfolio 
formation. The CS 6-6 strategy includes overlapping holding periods, and the return for 
month t is calculated as the equal-weighted average return of six portfolios that are 
formed before the holding period at times t-6 to t-1 following the methodology of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
 
All factor momentum strategies have positive and statistically significant average returns. 
The CS 1-1 strategy has the highest monthly average return of 1.00%, which is higher 
than for any of the 11 individual factors. It is also the only strategy that has negative, 
although not statistically significant, short-side returns. Consistent with the results of 
previous studies on factor momentum, both cross-sectional and time-series strategies 
have the best performance with the 1-month formation and holding periods. Contrary 
to the findings of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), the cross-
sectional strategies have higher average returns than time-series strategies on equal 
formation periods. This difference is likely explained by the fact that the cross-sectional 
portfolios of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) are long factors 
with above-median returns and short factors with below-median returns. I find that the 
average returns to all cross-sectional strategies are lower if the portfolios are long and 
short three factors instead of two factors. In comparison to the UMD factor, only cross-
sectional 1-1 and 6-1 strategies have higher average returns. The CS 6-6 strategy and 
UMD factor have equal average returns, but the returns to the UMD factor are less 
volatile.  
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Table 8. Summary statistics for factor momentum portfolios. 
Panel A – Monthly average factor momentum returns 
  Winner - Loser  Winner  Loser 
(L-H) ?̅? SD 𝑡(?̅?)   ?̅? SD 𝑡(?̅?)   ?̅?  SD 𝑡(?̅?) 
CS 1-1 1.00 % 4.42 % 5.89   0.90 % 2.63 % 8.95   -0.09 % 2.75 % -0.89 
CS 6-1 0.68 % 4.02 % 4.40   0.77 % 2.50 % 8.01   0.09 % 2.48 % 0.95 
CS 6-6 0.65 % 6.32 % 2.67   1.19 % 4.25 % 7.23   0.53 % 4.18 % 3.31 
CS 11-1 0.50 % 3.98 % 3.25   0.69 % 2.41 % 7.40   0.19 % 2.53 % 1.95 
CS 12-1 0.59 % 4.06 % 3.72   0.75 % 2.45 % 7.89   0.16 % 2.59 % 1.63 
TS 1-1 0.61 % 3.20 % 4.98   0.67 % 1.84 % 9.52   0.06 % 2.17 % 0.71 
TS 6-1 0.34 % 3.09 % 2.83   0.51 % 1.89 % 6.93   0.17 % 2.11 % 2.06 
TS 12-1 0.33 % 2.93 % 2.93   0.50 % 1.71 % 7.48   0.16 % 2.14 % 1.98 
Values in bold are statistically significant at a 5%-level 
        
Panel B – Lowest and highest monthly factor momentum returns 
  Winner - Loser  Winner  Loser 
(L-H) Min Max  Min Max  Min Max 
CS 1-1 -26.5 % 36.9 %  -12.1 % 16.3 %  -20.6 % 14.4 % 
CS 6-1 -17.7 % 21.0 %  -12.6 % 11.8 %  -15.7 % 12.4 % 
CS 6-6 -40.9 % 33.2 %  -29.6 % 20.3 %  -23.6 % 24.4 % 
CS 11-1 -21.0 % 18.6 %  -15.2 % 11.3 %  -12.1 % 10.1 % 
CS 12-1 -21.1 % 24.8 %  -15.2 % 11.3 %  -15.9 % 12.4 % 
TS 1-1 -22.5 % 15.6 %  -8.0 % 10.4 %  -12.2 % 14.4 % 
TS 6-1 -22.0 % 29.5 %  -13.7 % 18.4 %  -11.2 % 16.2 % 
TS 12-1 -22.0 % 21.3 %  -13.7 % 10.2 %  -12.4 % 16.2 % 
         
Panel C – Return distributions 
  Winner - Loser  Winner  Loser 
(L-H) Skewness Kurtosis  Skewness Kurtosis  Skewness Kurtosis 
CS 1-1 0.52 13.40  0.03 7.75  -0.60 11.45 
CS 6-1 -0.03 7.04  -0.21 6.37  -0.14 7.96 
CS 6-6 -0.71 8.60  -0.75 9.50  0.23 7.97 
CS 11-1 -0.36 6.87  -0.38 7.62  -0.03 6.59 
CS 12-1 -0.02 8.38  -0.38 7.46  -0.15 8.10 
TS 1-1 -0.32 10.45  0.03 7.00  0.26 10.19 
TS 6-1 0.22 21.29  0.43 21.16  0.72 11.78 
TS 12-1 -0.78 14.74  -0.70 14.18  0.86 11.70 
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The time-series strategies have lower volatilities because the portfolios are more 
diversified than the cross-sectional portfolios. The time-series 1-1, 6-1 and 12-1 
portfolios are, on average, long 6.1, 6.9 and 7.3 factors and short 4.9, 4.1 and 3.7 factors, 
respectively. The cross-sectional portfolios are by construction always long and short two 
factors. The annualized standard deviations of factor momentum strategies vary 
between 10.15% and 21.89%, and annualized returns between 4.03% and 12.67%.  
 
Performance of the CS 11-1 strategy is similar to the CS 12-1, but the summary statistics 
show that skipping a month before the holding period does not increase the 
performance of factor momentum. The results of Table 4 show that the conditional 
average returns after a positive 1- or 12-month return are higher than the unconditional 
average returns. Because the aggregate factor returns do not show evidence of short-
term reversals like individual stock returns do, skipping a month between the formation 
and holding periods does not increase the performance of factor momentum.  
 
Panel C of Table 8 shows that the CS 1-1 and TS 6-1 strategies have positively skewed 
return distributions while all other strategies have negatively skewed return distributions. 
None of the factor momentum strategies has a higher left tail risk than the UMD factor, 
which has a skewness of -1.3, and only the CS 6-6 strategy has a worse one-month return 
than the UMD factor. These findings suggest that factor momentum strategies do not 
suffer as severe crashes as the individual stock momentum strategy. 
 
Both cross-sectional strategies that are formed on 6-month lagged returns have similar 
long-short returns, but the returns of winner and loser portfolios show notable 
differences. While the CS 6-6 winner portfolio has the highest average returns, the 
strategy’s long-short returns are decreased by the returns of the loser factor portfolio. 
This finding suggests that it is costly to bet against the loser portfolio on longer holding 
periods because the returns of loser factors reverse towards their mean. The cross-
sectional 1-1 strategy is the only strategy that benefits from betting against the loser 
factors—the other strategies would be more profitable trading only the winner factors.  
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Panel A of Table 9 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between the returns of 
factor momentum strategies. The CS 11-1 strategy is omitted from here on because its 
performance is similar to the CS 12-1 strategy in all tests. The returns to time-series and 
cross-sectional strategies with equal formation periods are highly correlated even 
though the time-series portfolios are more diversified than the cross-sectional portfolios. 
Panel B reports the return correlations between factor momentum strategies and the 
UMD factor and factor momentum strategies and the STR factor. All factor momentum 
strategies are negatively correlated with the STR factor, and strategies with shorter 
formation periods are more negatively correlated with STR than strategies with longer 
formation periods. The correlations between UMD factor and factor momentum 
strategies are positive and linearly increasing with the length of the formation period. 
 
Table 9. Correlations of factor momentum returns. 
Panel A – Correlations between factor momentum strategies 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 
CS 1-1 1.00             
TS 1-1 0.90 1.00           
CS 6-1 0.41 0.38 1.00         
CS 6-6 0.15 0.10 0.76 1.00       
TS 6-1 0.30 0.34 0.79 0.65 1.00     
CS 12-1 0.28 0.25 0.72 0.82 0.70 1.00   
TS 12-1 0.27 0.29 0.62 0.71 0.84 0.84 1.00 
Panel B – Correlations between factor momentum strategies and UMD and STR factors 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 
UMD 0.10 0.12 0.46 0.58 0.53 0.68 0.66 
STR -0.69 -0.67 -0.42 -0.19 -0.40 -0.32 -0.32 
 
To better understand the correlations of factor momentum strategies, Table 10 presents 
the relative factor weights for 1-1 and 6-1 portfolios. The weights are calculated by 
dividing the frequency a factor is included in the winner (loser) portfolio by the total 
number of factors each strategy holds in its winner (loser) portfolio over the whole 
sample period.  
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Table 10. Factor weights in winner and loser portfolios.  
 CS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 
  Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
ASSETG 4.7 % 6.1 % 3.9 % 7.4 % 8.6 % 9.7 % 8.70 % 9.8 % 
BAB 16.4 % 7.2 % 21.0 % 7.2 % 10.8 % 7.0 % 10.61 % 6.5 % 
BM 6.7 % 6.1 % 6.3 % 6.3 % 8.8 % 9.4 % 8.68 % 9.8 % 
CFP 4.8 % 4.9 % 4.6 % 4.1 % 9.0 % 9.2 % 8.68 % 9.8 % 
DP 6.3 % 11.7 % 3.7 % 16.9 % 8.0 % 10.5 % 7.00 % 12.6 % 
EP 4.7 % 5.5 % 3.7 % 5.1 % 8.9 % 9.4 % 8.57 % 10.0 % 
HMLD 8.3 % 12.7 % 9.5 % 12.5 % 8.3 % 10.0 % 8.14 % 10.7 % 
STR 12.1 % 11.2 % 12.4 % 7.6 % 9.2 % 8.9 % 10.29 % 7.1 % 
OP 7.6 % 10.7 % 5.9 % 10.3 % 9.1 % 9.1 % 9.30 % 8.7 % 
QMJ 10.1 % 10.9 % 8.9 % 11.2 % 9.1 % 9.1 % 9.49 % 8.4 % 
UMD 18.2 % 12.9 % 20.0 % 11.4 % 10.2 % 7.7 % 10.55 % 6.6 % 
 
The winner portfolio of the CS 1-1 strategy overweighs BAB, STR, QMJ and UMD factors 
and underweights the remaining factors. The winner portfolio of the CS 6-1 strategy 
overweighs BAB, STR and UMD factors and underweights the remaining factors. Both 
time-series strategies trade BAB and UMD factors similarly more often in the winner 
portfolios, but these strategies have lower weights on the traded factors.  
 
To understand how the factor momentum strategies have performed over time and 
against the UMD factor, Figures 3 and 4 plot the cumulative returns of $1 invested. Figure 
3 plots the cumulative raw returns, and Figure 4 the cumulative returns of portfolios that 
are scaled to have monthly volatility of the UMD factor. The y-axis in both figures is in 
logarithmic form. The cumulative returns of the CS 1-1 strategy are superior to any other 
strategy. When the monthly volatilities are scaled to match the volatility of the UMD 
factor, CS 1-1, TS 1-1 and CS 6-1 outperform the UMD factor. The cumulative returns 
show that factor momentum strategies are not similarly prone to crashes like the UMD 
factor. For example, the UMD factor lost 49.09% of its cumulative value from the end of 
March 2009 to the end of May 2009, while the CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies gained 26.39% 
and 11.35%, respectively. Nevertheless, the summary statistics of Table 8 show that 
factor momentum portfolios have still experienced significant drawdowns, and therefore, 
testing the impact of volatility scaling on factor momentum portfolios is justified.  
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Figure 3. Cumulative factor momentum returns, July 1964–December 2019. 
 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative factor momentum returns, July 1964–December 2019 (scaled). 
  
1
10
100
1000
08/64 06/68 04/72 02/76 12/79 10/83 08/87 06/91 04/95 02/99 12/02 10/06 08/10 06/14 04/18
TS 1-1 CS 1-1 TS 6-1 CS 6-1 TS 12-1 CS 12-1 UMD
71 
Table 11 reports the performance of long-short factor momentum strategies against the 
five-factor and six-factor models of Fama and French (2015, 2018). Reported are the 
coefficient estimates with the corresponding t-statistics and the adjusted R-squared for 
the regression model. Panel A reports the regression estimates for the FF5 model and 
Panel B for the FF6 model.  
 
Table 11. FF5 and FF6 model regressions for factor momentum portfolios. 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6 
Panel A – FF5 model 
Alpha 0.874 0.550 0.760 0.434 0.645 0.361 0.736  
(4.96) (3.69) (4.74) (2.73) (3.51) (2.42) (2.79) 
MKT-RF -0.044 -0.070 -0.069 -0.101 -0.062 -0.053 -0.071 
  (-0.70) (-1.53) (-0.91) (-1.76) (-0.82) (-0.97) (-0.57) 
SMB 0.027 0.036 0.149 0.117 0.259 0.157 0.398 
  (0.34) (0.58) (1.79) (1.42) (2.85) (2.19) (2.94) 
HML -0.168 -0.130 -0.219 -0.227 -0.394 -0.303 -0.351 
  (-1.22) (-1.23) (-1.44) (-1.66) (-2.36) (-2.45) (-1.40) 
RMW 0.166 0.044 -0.105 -0.207 0.000 -0.055 0.043 
  (1.01) (0.32) (-0.56) (-0.99) (0.00) (-0.33) (0.16) 
CMA 0.550 0.441 0.059 0.191 0.097 0.235 -0.162 
  (3.58) (3.78) (0.30) (1.04) (0.46) (1.49) (-0.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.060 0.029 0.067 0.085 0.070 0.063 
Panel B – FF6 model 
Alpha 0.815 0.493 0.436 0.150 0.176 0.038 0.094 
  (4.33) (3.40) (2.68) (1.23) (1.42) (0.41) (0.38) 
MKT-RF -0.033 -0.058 -0.003 -0.043 0.035 0.015 0.060 
  (-0.55) (-1.35) (-0.05) (-1.09) (0.76) (0.45) (0.72) 
SMB 0.022 0.031 0.121 0.092 0.217 0.129 0.343 
  (0.28) (0.52) (2.03) (1.45) (3.90) (2.52) (4.11) 
HML -0.124 -0.087 0.028 -0.011 -0.031 -0.052 0.138 
  (-1.16) (-1.02) (0.25) (-0.13) (-0.30) (-0.71) (0.74) 
RMW 0.147 0.025 -0.209 -0.299 -0.154 -0.161 -0.164 
  (0.88) (0.19) (-1.70) (-1.96) (-1.75) (-1.77) (-0.96) 
CMA 0.520 0.412 -0.110 0.043 -0.151 0.064 -0.498 
  (3.48) (3.70) (-0.75) (0.35) (-1.45) (0.78) (-2.04) 
UMD 0.082 0.080 0.458 0.402 0.672 0.463 0.908 
  (0.59) (0.94) (5.23) (7.56) (12.01) (13.88) (7.42) 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.069 0.236 0.336 0.526 0.473 0.392 
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The results of Table 11 show that all factor momentum strategies have statistically 
significant FF5 model alphas. The alphas of the CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies are slightly 
lower than their unconditional average returns, but their statistical significance is higher 
after controlling for the FF5 factors. The alphas of the remaining three CS and two TS 
strategies exceed their unconditional average returns. The adjusted coefficient of 
determination (R2) is below 10% for every regression model. These findings are in line 
with the results of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Arnott et al. (2018) and show that the FF5 
model is unable to explain factor momentum returns regardless of the formation period.  
 
Regressing the factor momentum returns on the FF6 model lowers the alphas of all 
factor momentum strategies, and four of the strategies lose statistical significance. The 
six-factor model does little to explain the returns of 1-1 strategies, but it captures well 
the average returns of 12-1, CS 6-6 and TS 6-1 strategies. The returns to these strategies 
are explained almost completely by the UMD factor. The annualized alphas for the CS    
1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies are 10.23% and 6.08%, respectively. Arnott et al. (2018) find 
similarly that CS 1-1 and CS 6-6 strategies have significant alphas against the FF6 model. 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) find that time-series portfolios that are formed on 1-, 6- and 12-
month lagged returns have significantly positive alpha against the UMD factor, but the 
results of Table 11 show that only the TS 1-1 strategy has significantly positive alpha 
against the FF6 model. 
 
The CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies have significantly positive exposure to the CMA factor 
in both FF5 and FF6 model regression. However, Table 10 shows that both of these 
strategies trade the ASSETG factor less than almost any other factor. Instead, the 
investment factor in five- and six-factor model specifications is likely to capture both 
value and investment characteristics, similar to what Fama and French (2015) find in 
their five-factor model tests. All cross-sectional and time-series strategies with matching 
formation periods have similar factor loadings, but the coefficients across different 
formation periods show substantial variation. This finding suggests that each formation 
period captures different types of mispricing by trading different factors. 
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To test whether the three-factor model of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) can explain the 
factor momentum returns better than the FF5 and FF6 models, I regress the factor 
momentum returns on MKT, FIN and PEAD factors. Panel A of Table 12 presents the 
regression estimates for the DH3 model and Panel B for the FF6 model. Reported in 
parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics and the adjusted 
coefficients of determination (R2) for the regression models. The sample period spans 
from July 1972 to December 2018. Because the sample period is shorter than previously, 
the first row reports the unconditional average returns for the sub-sample.  
 
Table 12. DH3 and FF6 model regressions for factor momentum portfolios. 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6 
Mean 1.064 0.653 0.653 0.303 0.613 0.358 0.619 
Panel A – DH3 model 
Alpha 0.712 0.437 0.245 0.021 0.167 0.009 -0.026 
  (2.56) (2.23) (1.18) (0.13) (0.73) (0.06) (-0.08) 
MKT-RF -0.037 -0.081 0.006 -0.070 0.026 -0.008 0.080 
  (-0.52) (-1.44) (0.07) (-1.16) (0.31) (-0.13) (0.61) 
FIN 0.187 0.096 -0.041 -0.087 -0.047 -0.032 -0.041 
  (1.71) (0.92) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.23) 
PEAD 0.375 0.303 0.704 0.619 0.754 0.609 1.021 
  (1.61) (2.15) (4.68) (3.67) (4.99) (4.87) (5.50) 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.062 0.098 0.142 0.109 0.139 0.082 
Panel B – FF6 model 
Alpha 0.847 0.510 0.388 0.100 0.203 0.049 0.076 
  (3.96) (3.12) (2.06) (0.73) (1.40) (0.49) (0.26) 
MKT-RF -0.028 -0.063 0.006 -0.046 0.031 0.012 0.055 
  (-0.43) (-1.33) (0.09) (-1.09) (0.60) (0.34) (0.61) 
SMB 0.011 0.021 0.123 0.102 0.208 0.132 0.326 
  (0.12) (0.31) (1.82) (1.43) (3.33) (2.30) (3.19) 
HML -0.152 -0.103 0.056 0.011 -0.011 -0.027 0.173 
  (-1.34) (-1.15) (0.45) (0.12) (-0.09) (-0.35) (0.83) 
RMW 0.170 0.032 -0.208 -0.315 -0.179 -0.190 -0.227 
  (0.99) (0.23) (-1.57) (-2.04) (-1.92) (-2.11) (-1.16) 
CMA 0.600 0.457 -0.119 0.045 -0.138 0.081 -0.466 
  (3.85) (3.92) (-0.69) (0.33) (-1.15) (0.93) (-1.55) 
UMD 0.071 0.086 0.487 0.428 0.700 0.486 0.934 
  (0.46) (0.90) (4.98) (7.67) (11.45) (14.10) (6.64) 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.077 0.261 0.372 0.543 0.513 0.392 
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Panel A of Table 12 shows that the DH3 model explains the factor momentum returns 
better than the FF6 model. Both CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies still have statistically 
significant alphas, but the alphas and their statistical significance are lower than in the 
FF6 model regressions. All factor momentum strategies, except CS 1-1, have significantly 
high loadings on the PEAD factor. Panel B shows that the FF6 model alphas are similar as 
in Table 11, but their t-statistics are slightly lower here due to the shorter sample period. 
The factor loadings are also similar in the sub-sample as in the full sample period. The 
regression estimates for the FF5 model (not reported) are similar as in Table 11. 
 
To test whether the winner- and loser-factor portfolios have different exposures to the 
DH3 model, Table 13 repeats the DH3 model regression separately for the winner- and 
loser-factor portfolios.  
 
Table 13. DH3 model regressions for winner- and loser-factor portfolios  
Panel A – Winner-factor portfolios (long) 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6 
Alpha 0.610 0.499 0.410 0.238 0.446 0.265 0.512 
  (4.38) (5.70) (3.31) (2.60) (3.46) (2.89) (2.33) 
MKT-RF -0.026 -0.041 -0.032 -0.052 -0.002 -0.041 -0.024 
  (-0.72) (-1.39) (-0.74) (-1.47) (-0.04) (-1.26) (-0.35) 
FIN 0.354 0.241 0.213 0.135 0.214 0.164 0.478 
  (7.04) (3.99) (2.76) (1.29) (2.46) (2.04) (4.12) 
PEAD 0.177 0.113 0.401 0.337 0.346 0.274 0.602 
  (1.58) (1.98) (5.30) (2.58) (4.05) (3.04) (4.79) 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.299 0.191 0.207 0.155 0.242 0.227 
Panel B – Loser-factor portfolios (short) 
  CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6 
Alpha -0.102 0.062 0.165 0.217 0.279 0.256 0.538 
  (-0.62) (0.45) (1.31) (1.75) (2.20) (2.17) (2.81) 
MKT-RF 0.011 0.039 -0.038 0.018 -0.028 -0.034 -0.104 
  (0.27) (1.12) (-0.93) (0.47) (-0.66) (-0.89) (-1.42) 
FIN 0.167 0.145 0.254 0.222 0.261 0.196 0.519 
  (2.27) (2.64) (5.41) (4.90) (4.27) (4.51) (6.01) 
PEAD -0.197 -0.190 -0.303 -0.283 -0.408 -0.335 -0.419 
  (-1.50) (-2.08) (-3.50) (-4.70) (-5.26) (-6.16) (-3.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.074 0.229 0.203 0.255 0.235 0.313 
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The estimates of Table 13 show that winner-factor portfolios have significantly positive 
exposure to the PEAD factor and loser-factor portfolios have significantly negative 
exposure to the PEAD factor. These findings suggest that the returns of prior winner-
factor portfolios stem from positive earnings surprises and the returns of loser-factor 
portfolios from negative earnings surprises. To the extent that the PEAD factor captures 
mispricing, winner factors profit by being long in underpriced stocks and short in 
overpriced stocks. Oppositely, loser factors’ negative exposure to the PEAD factor 
suggests that loser factors capture mispricing by being long in overpriced stocks and 
short in underpriced stocks.  
 
These findings and interpretations are consistent with the expectation that, on average, 
individual long-short factors capture mispricing by being long in underpriced stocks and 
short in overpriced stocks. When the long-short factor returns turn negative, previously 
overpriced stocks have become underpriced, and previously underpriced stocks have 
become overpriced. If the mispricing continues in the short-term, factor momentum 
portfolios profit by trading the factor oppositely to its long-term average. This means 
shorting the stocks that are now overpriced and buying the stocks that are now relatively 
underpriced. The summary statistics of Table 8 and the results of Table 13 show that only 
the cross-sectional 1-1 loser-factor portfolio captures negative average returns. The 
returns of the loser-factor portfolios increase with the length of the formation period, 
suggesting that the short-term contrary mispricing is not as persistent as long-term 
mispricing. This interpretation is also supported by the results of Table 4. 
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6.1 Investor sentiment and factor momentum 
Having shown that the individual factor returns are significantly affected by the 
prevailing investor sentiment, I now test whether the factor momentum returns are 
dependent on investor sentiment. Because individual factor returns are affected by the 
contemporaneous investor sentiment and factor momentum returns are, at least partly, 
driven by mispricing, I expect the long-short factor momentum returns to be dependent 
on investor sentiment but with the opposite effect. This hypothesis is motivated by the 
previous results and the findings of Stambaugh et al. (2012)—a long-short factor is, on 
average, more profitable in high investor sentiment because increased overpricing 
causes the short-side returns to be lower (i.e., more profitable) in high sentiment. The 
factor momentum returns should, therefore, be lower in high investor sentiment, like 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) find, because betting against loser factors becomes more 
expensive when the long-short factors have higher average returns. I also expect that 
the returns of loser factor portfolios are more affected by the contemporaneous investor 
sentiment than the returns of winner-factor portfolios because the loser factor portfolios 
exhibit returns that are contrary to long-term factor returns, and thus more likely to be 
affected by the investor sentiment.  
 
To test these hypotheses, I regress the factor momentum returns on investor sentiment 
dummy variables. I use the one-month lagged value of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) 
investor sentiment index as a proxy for investor sentiment at the time of the portfolio 
formation. Table 14, Panel A reports the regression estimates for factor momentum 
portfolios conditional on high, mild, and low investor sentiment. As a robustness test, 
Panel B reports the estimates conditional on investor sentiment that is either above or 
below the median value. The investor sentiment index has a zero-mean, and median 
close to zero (0.024). Reported are the regression estimates for the long-short factor 
portfolio, and separately for the winner and loser portfolios. The t-statistics are 
calculated using the robust standard errors of Newey and West (1987) and reported in 
parentheses below the regression estimates. The sample period is August 1965–
December 2018. Estimates reported in bold are statistically significant at a 5%-level.   
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Table 14. Factor momentum returns conditional on investor sentiment. 
Panel A  
  CS 1-1   CS 6-1   CS 6-6 
  WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
HIGH 0.814 1.223 0.409 
 
0.566 1.045 0.479 
 
-0.060 1.525 1.585 
  (2.60) (5.26) (1.85) 
 
(2.23) (4.92) (2.74) 
 
(-0.13) (3.86) (5.03) 
MILD 1.444 0.959 -0.485 
 
1.095 0.870 -0.225 
 
1.396 1.275 -0.120 
  (5.05) (7.22) (-2.51) 
 
(4.44) (5.55) (-1.59) 
 
(3.46) (4.61) (-0.45) 
LOW 0.853 0.677 -0.175 
 
0.370 0.476 0.106 
 
0.480 0.868 0.388 
  (3.43) (4.17) (-1.15) 
 
(1.28) (2.77) (0.59) 
 
(0.99) (2.60) (1.37) 
HIGH - -0.039 0.545 0.584 
 
0.196 0.569 0.373 
 
-0.540 0.656 1.197 
LOW (-0.10) (1.91) (2.18) 
 
(0.50) (2.04) (1.48) 
 
(-0.80) (1.26) (2.83) 
  
 
                    
  TS 1-1   TS 6-1   TS 12-1 
  WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
HIGH 0.435 0.891 0.457 
 
0.223 0.821 0.598 
 
0.026 0.686 0.660 
  (1.78) (5.81) (2.09) 
 
(1.04) (5.67) (2.65) 
 
(0.13) (4.46) (2.79) 
MILD 0.945 0.718 -0.228 
 
0.606 0.431 -0.176 
 
0.523 0.478 -0.045 
  (4.52) (7.60) (-1.62) 
 
(3.64) (4.46) (-1.39) 
 
(2.96) (5.75) (-0.33) 
LOW 0.547 0.526 -0.021 
 
0.143 0.343 0.200 
 
0.433 0.389 -0.045 
  (3.65) (4.37) (-0.17) 
 
(0.63) (2.08) (1.46) 
 
(1.92) (2.38) (-0.40) 
HIGH - -0.112 0.366 0.478 
 
0.080 0.478 0.398 
 
-0.407 0.297 0.705 
LOW (-0.39) (1.87) (1.90) 
 
(0.25) (2.17) (1.51) 
 
(-1.33) (1.32) (2.69) 
Panel B  
  CS 1-1   CS 6-1   CS 6-6 
  WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
ABOVE 0.945 1.091 0.146 
 
0.779 1.042 0.263 
 
0.422 1.515 1.092 
  (4.48) (6.95) (0.91) 
 
(3.99) (7.36) (1.87) 
 
(1.29) (5.76) (4.29) 
BELOW 1.202 0.815 -0.387 
 
0.663 0.570 -0.093 
 
0.943 0.943 0.000 
  (5.72) (6.69) (-2.92) 
 
(3.25) (4.62) (-0.71) 
 
(2.71) (4.03) (0.00) 
ABOVE - -0.257 0.276 0.533 
 
0.117 0.472 0.355 
 
-0.520 0.572 1.092 
BELOW (-0.93) (1.42) (2.83) 
 
(0.42) (2.54) (1.92) 
 
(-1.09) (1.68) (3.39) 
                        
  TS 1-1   TS 6-1   TS 12-1 
  WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
 
WML Winner Loser 
ABOVE 0.632 0.833 0.201 
 
0.374 0.702 0.327 
 
0.142 0.616 0.474 
  (3.63) (7.71) (1.34) 
 
(2.32) (6.96) (2.06) 
 
(0.92) (6.05) (2.82) 
BELOW 0.699 0.591 -0.108 
 
0.331 0.344 0.013 
 
0.546 0.412 -0.134 
  (5.23) (7.21) (-1.00) 
 
(2.15) (3.11) (0.12) 
 
(3.44) (3.80) (-1.41) 
ABOVE - -0.067 0.242 0.309 
 
0.043 0.357 0.315 
 
-0.405 0.203 0.608 
BELOW (-0.34) (1.81) (1.77) 
 
(0.19) (2.39) (1.68) 
 
(-1.88) (1.37) (3.26) 
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The regression estimates for the TS 12-1 strategy in Panel B of Table 14 are, expectedly, 
similar to the results of Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) as the construction of factor 
momentum portfolios and the measurement of investor sentiment are identical. 
However, Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) only consider the relation between TS 12-1 
factor momentum and investor sentiment. The results here suggest that the relation 
between investor sentiment and the performance of factor momentum is dependent on 
the look-back period and how the factor momentum portfolios are constructed. The 
results of Table 14 show two important findings that contradict the findings of Ehsani 
and Linnainmaa (2019). 
 
First, while Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) find that the winner-factor portfolios have 
similar performance in high and low investor sentiment, the results here show that 
winner factor portfolios that are formed using six-month lagged returns (CS 6-1 and TS 
6-1) have significantly higher returns following periods of high investor sentiment. 
Furthermore, the returns of all winner-factor portfolios are positively correlated with the 
investor sentiment. The returns of loser-factor portfolios exhibit larger variation 
between investor sentiment states and are always, similarly to the returns of winner-
factor portfolios, highest following periods of high investor sentiment state. This finding 
is consistent with the results of Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019). However, the returns of 
loser-factor portfolios are not significantly negative following periods of low investor 
sentiment like Ehsani and Linnainmaa find. Only the CS 1-1 loser-factor portfolio in Panel 
B has significantly negative average returns after low investor sentiment state.  
 
Second, the returns of WML factor momentum portfolios are not significantly different 
between high and low or above and below the median investor sentiment states. While 
the differences in average WML portfolio returns between high and low sentiment are 
negative for four out of six strategies, none of the differences is statistically significant. 
The TS 12-1 WML strategy in Panel B replicates the findings of Ehsani and Linnainmaa 
(2019), but the long-short returns of the five other factor momentum portfolios are less 
affected by investor sentiment. In Panel A, the CS 1-1 strategy has statistically significant 
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average returns in all investor sentiment states, while the other WML portfolios lose 
statistical significance either in high or low (or both) sentiment states. In Panel B, four of 
the long-short factor momentum portfolios have significantly positive returns in both 
investor sentiment states. Contrary to the expected results, the average returns to all 
long-short strategies are highest following mild investor sentiment and exceed the 
unconditional average returns. The results of Table 7 explain this finding—the variation 
in long-short factor returns is at the highest following mild investor sentiment. 
 
Although the performance of long-short factor momentum is not significantly affected 
by the prevailing investor sentiment, the results suggest that factor momentum is driven 
by mispricing.  Winner factor portfolios capture mispricing in all sentiment states. The 
fact that winner factors have higher average returns following periods of high investor 
sentiment and loser factors have significant average returns only following high investor 
sentiment suggest that mispricing is more pronounced when investor sentiment is high. 
Furthermore, the fact that mispricing is affected by investor sentiment like Stambaugh 
et al. (2012) suggest has still an important implication on factor momentum strategies. 
Following periods of high investor sentiment, betting against the loser factors, while the 
mispricing is at its strongest, decreases the performance of long-short factor momentum.  
This effect is more pronounced when the formation or holding period is longer than a 
month. When the investor sentiment is low and the mispricing is less pronounced, the 
returns of loser factors tend to reverse, and betting against the loser factors increases 
the profitability of factor momentum.  
 
To test whether a factor momentum investor can benefit from mispricing that varies with 
investor sentiment, I construct three cross-sectional and time-series factor momentum 
strategies that consider the prevailing investor sentiment state. For brevity, I only 
consider strategies with the one-month formation and holding periods. The first CS 1-1 
and TS 1-1 WML strategies are constructed as previously (i.e., the prevailing investor 
sentiment does not affect portfolio formation). The second set of factor momentum 
strategies (WML**) are always long winner factors, but short loser factors only following 
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periods of mild or low investor sentiment. As a robustness test, the third set of factor 
momentum strategies are always long winner factors, but short loser factors only 
following periods of investor sentiment that is below the median. Fundamentally, the 
strategies bet against the loser factor portfolio only when the contemporaneous value 
of dummy variable LOWt or MILDt (BELOWt) equals one. The drawback of this approach 
is that it is not implementable ex-ante as it uses the information of the whole sample 
period. 
 
Table 15 reports the summary statistics for factor momentum portfolios that use the 
information of investor sentiment to time short positions in loser factor portfolios. Panel 
A reports the statistics for WML portfolios that do not account for the investor sentiment 
(i.e., the WML portfolios are constructed as previously). The portfolios in Panel B are 
always long winner factors, but short loser factors only when the investor sentiment is 
categorized as mild or low at the time of the portfolio formation. Panel C reports the 
statistics for WML portfolios that are always long winner factors and short loser factors 
only when investor sentiment is below the median. Periods of high, mild and low (above 
and below the median) investor sentiment are defined as previously.  
 
Table 15. Results for timing short positions in loser-factor portfolios. 
 Panel A – Always long winner factors and always short loser factors 
 ?̅? 𝑡(?̅?) Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis 
CS 1-1 WML 1.08 % (6.13) 36.9 % -26.5 % 4.45 % 0.54 13.52 
TS 1-1 WML 0.67 % (5.24) 15.6 % -22.5 % 3.25 % -0.35 10.36 
        
Panel B - Short loser-factor portfolio when dummy variable MILD=1 or LOW=1 
 ?̅? 𝑡(?̅?) Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis 
CS 1-1 WML** 1.20 % (7.47) 36.9 % -13.2 % 4.07 % 1.13 14.26 
TS 1-1 WML** 0.81 % (7.30) 15.6 % -10.9 % 2.81 % 0.42 7.24 
        
Panel C - Short loser-factor portfolio when dummy variable BELOW=1 
 ?̅? 𝑡(?̅?) Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis 
CS 1-1 WML** 1.13 % (7.45) 36.9 % -13.2 % 3.84 % 1.36 17.33 
TS 1-1 WML** 0.76 % (7.34) 15.6 % -10.9 % 2.61 % 0.41 8.44 
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The result of Panels B and C suggest that the performance of CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 factor 
momentum strategies can be increased by timing short position on loser factors using 
the measure of investor sentiment. The portfolios in Panels B and C have higher average 
returns and lower standard deviations than the portfolios that are always long (short) 
winner (loser) factors. Even though the strategy is not implementable ex-ante, this test 
serves the purpose to show that investor sentiment could be used to increase the 
profitability of factor momentum investing.  
 
 
6.2 Risk-managed factor momentum 
Motivated by the performance of risk-managed momentum strategies, I test whether 
the option-implied stock market volatility can be used to increase the performance of 
factor momentum. I follow the methodology of Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015), but 
instead of using realized volatility, I use the 1-month lagged month-end value of VIX as a 
proxy for the expected market volatility. Because I use the month-end values of VIX, the 
1-month lagged value is the most accurate proxy for the option-implied market volatility 
at the time of the portfolio construction.  
 
Although factor momentum does not suffer crashes like price momentum portfolios, the 
strategy is still subject to significant drawdowns. Furthermore, testing the impact of 
target volatility on factor momentum portfolios contributes to the literature of risk 
management as currently, studies offer mixed results regarding the benefits of risk 
management (see, e.g., Liu et al., 2019). I expect that the scaled average returns exceed 
the unscaled returns with equal risk-level. This expectation is motivated by the findings 
of Moreira and Muir (2017)—volatility-managed factor portfolios have higher alphas and 
Sharpe ratios than portfolios that do not scale the portfolio weights. Because factor 
momentum times investments in individual factors, I expect that increasing (decreasing) 
portfolio weights when the market volatility is expected to be low (high) increases the 
overall performance of factor momentum.  
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I use a target annualized volatility of 20%, which is close to the long-term average of VIX, 
to calculate the portfolio weights for each month. Figure 5 plots the monthly WML* 
portfolio weights (scaling factor) from February 1990 to December 2019 with a target 
volatility of 20%. The scaling factor varies between 0.33 and 2.10, with an average of 
1.17. These portfolio weights are similar to the risk-managed momentum strategy of 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015), who report that in their approach the portfolio weights 
vary between 0.13 and 2.00, with an average of 0.90. 
 
 
Figure 5. WML* portfolio weights, February 1990–December 2019. 
 
Panel A of Table 16 reports the summary statistics for the unscaled (WML) and Panel B 
for the scaled (WML*) factor momentum portfolios. The data for VIX is available from 
January 1990 onwards, and therefore, the sample period spans from February 1990 to 
December 2019. The CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies have slightly higher average returns in 
the sub-sample than in the full sample, but CS 6-6, TS 6-1 and TS 12-1 strategies have 
lower average returns that are not statistically significant in the sub-sample. The lowest 
and highest one-month returns are the same in the sub-sample as in the full sample. All 
strategies, except the CS 6-6, are more volatile in the sub-sample. Panel B of Table 16 
shows that all risk-managed factor momentum portfolios have higher average returns 
and lower monthly volatility than the unscaled WML portfolios. Furthermore, the 
average returns of scaled factor momentum portfolios are statistically significant with 
higher t-statistics than the unscaled portfolios.  
83 
Table 16. Summary statistics for risk-managed factor momentum portfolios. 
Panel A – Unscaled WML factor momentum 
 CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1 
Mean 1.05 % 0.66 % 0.60 % 0.62 % 0.68 % 0.22 % 0.31 % 
  (3.96) (2.98) (1.74) (2.74) (3.60) (1.15) (1.83) 
Maximum 36.91 % 20.92 % 33.17 % 24.82 % 15.56 % 29.52 % 21.28 % 
Minimum -26.51 % -17.75 % -40.90 % -21.06 % -22.46 % -21.98 % -21.98 % 
Volatility 5.01 % 4.18 % 6.57 % 4.30 % 3.58 % 3.56 % 3.24 % 
Skewness 0.64 0.25 -0.43 0.10 -0.42 0.48 -0.84 
Kurtosis 13.61 6.63 9.91 8.71 10.73 21.78 17.03 
 
Panel B – Scaled WML factor momentum, annualized target volatility 20% 
 CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1* 
Mean 1.17 % 0.78 % 0.75 % 0.78 % 0.76 % 0.33 % 0.41 % 
  (4.92) (3.75) (2.22) (3.68) (4.38) (2.01) (2.63) 
Maximum 18.32 % 16.77 % 28.05 % 19.90 % 12.41 % 23.67 % 17.06 % 
Minimum -22.42 % -11.40 % -26.27 % -13.53 % -18.99 % -16.38 % -16.38 % 
Volatility 4.50 % 3.93 % 6.42 % 4.03 % 3.30 % 3.07 % 2.97 % 
Skewness -0.04 0.28 -0.04 0.24 -0.33 0.70 -0.18 
Kurtosis 6.32 4.22 5.55 5.11 7.51 14.91 9.60 
 
The risk-managed factor momentum portfolios have less negative worst 1-month returns 
than unscaled portfolios. However, also the highest 1-month returns are lower for risk-
managed portfolios. Volatility scaling lowers the kurtosis and generally shifts the return 
distributions towards the right tale. However, the CS 1-1 strategy has a slightly negative 
(-0.04) skewness after volatility scaling whereas the unscaled portfolio has a positively 
skewed (0.64) return distribution. These findings suggest that the performance of factor 
momentum is increased after volatility scaling, but the benefits are not as remarkable as 
they are for price momentum portfolios (e.g., Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016). 
 
Figure 6 plots the cumulative returns to $1 invested in the unscaled and scaled CS 1-1 
and TS 1-1 WML portfolios. The y-axis is in logarithmic form. Figure 6 shows that the 
cumulative returns of both risk-managed portfolios exceed the unscaled returns. The 
cumulative returns are at the highest in August 2017 and continue to decrease until the 
end of 2019. Both CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies have negative average returns in 2019 
and a weak performance in 2018. The low performance of these factor momentum 
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portfolios stems from low factor returns—eight of the long-short factors have negative 
average returns in 2019, and in 2018 eight of the factors have average returns that are 
below their long-term averages. However, the CS 12-1 and TS 12-1 strategies both have 
a monthly average return of over 1% in 2019, suggesting that strategies with longer 
formation periods occasionally perform better.  
 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative returns of scaled 1-1 factor momentum portfolios. 
 
To test whether the risk-managed factor momentum portfolios perform significantly 
better than the plain factor momentum portfolios, I regress the scaled WML* return 
series on the unscaled WML returns. Panel A of Table 17 presents the alphas for each 
risk-managed factor momentum portfolio (WML*) against the corresponding unscaled 
factor momentum portfolio (i.e., the portfolio with equal formation and holding periods). 
As a robustness test, I regress the risk-managed factor momentum returns on the FF5 
model that is augmented with the corresponding factor momentum portfolio (Panel B) 
and on the FF6 model (Panel C). The sample period is February 1990–December 2019. 
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All risk-managed factor momentum portfolios, except the CS 6-6 strategy, have 
statistically significant alphas against the plain factor momentum portfolios. The alphas 
against FF5 factors and unscaled factor momentum portfolios (Panel B) are higher, but 
not statistically significant for TS 1-1, TS 12-1 and CS 6-6 strategies. Panel C of Table 17 
shows that the FF6 factors have similar explanatory power on the risk-managed factor 
momentum returns as the unscaled factor momentum portfolios (Panel A). 
 
Table 17. Performance of risk-managed factor momentum. 
Panel A – Alpha against corresponding unscaled factor momentum portfolio 
 
CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1* 
Alpha 0.299 0.197 0.198 0.238 0.172 0.149 0.143 
  (3.38) (3.12) (1.66) (2.97) (3.61) (3.13) (2.55) 
                
Panel B – Alpha against FF5 model and corresponding factor momentum portfolio 
  CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1* 
Alpha 1.116 0.720 0.382 0.573 0.744 0.744 0.220 
  (4.50) (3.42) (1.07) (2.94) (0.76) (3.99) (1.70) 
                
Panel C – Alpha against FF6 model 
  CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1* 
Alpha 0.324 0.190 0.146 0.197 0.180 0.147 0.122 
  (2.85) (2.69) (1.19) (2.28) (2.87) (2.85) (2.01) 
 
While Figures 3 and 4 that plot the cumulative returns of factor momentum portfolios 
suggest that factor momentum does not exhibit crashes similar to the price momentum, 
the performance of factor momentum is nevertheless increased by volatility scaling. As 
noted earlier, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) find that momentum portfolios exhibit 
optionality during bear market states. To further test whether the factor momentum 
portfolios are subject to optionality and momentum crashes, similar to price momentum, 
I follow the methodology of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016, p. 227) and regress factor 
momentum returns on the following model: 
 
𝑅𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = (α0 + α𝛽 ∙ I𝐵,𝑡−1) + (𝛽0 + I𝐵,𝑡−1(𝛽𝐵 + I𝑈,𝑡 ∙ 𝛽𝐵,𝑈)) 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, (20) 
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where I𝐵,𝑡−1 is an ex-ante bear market indicator variable, I𝑈,𝑡 is a contemporaneous up-
market indicator variable and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the excess market return. Following Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016), the bear market indicator variable (I𝐵,𝑡−1) equals to one when the 
24-month cumulative excess market returns is negative, and zero otherwise. The up-
market indicator variable (I𝑈,𝑡) equals to one when the excess market returns exceeds 
the risk-free rate, and zero otherwise.  
 
Table 18, Panel A reports the optionality regressions for factor momentum portfolios and 
Panel B for the risk-managed factor momentum portfolios. The sample period in Panel A 
is July 1965–December 2019 and February 1990–December 2019 in Panel B. The t-
statistic for each regression estimate is reported in parentheses below the estimate. 
Following the interpretations of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), ?̂?0 + ?̂?𝐵 is the estimate 
for bear market beta when the contemporaneous market return is negative, and ?̂?0 +
?̂?𝐵 + ?̂?𝐵,𝑈   is the estimate for bear market beta when the contemporaneous market 
return is positive. Significantly negative ?̂?𝐵,𝑈 implies option-like behavior in bear markets 
(Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016). 
 
The regression estimates of Table 18 suggest that only the CS 6-6 factor momentum 
portfolio exhibits optionality in bear markets, and the point estimate for ?̂?𝐵,𝑈 is not 
statistically significant for the risk-managed CS 6-6 portfolio. Furthermore, the strategy’s 
point estimate for α𝛽 is highly positive, although not statistically significant, whereas all 
other factor momentum strategies (except TS 12-1) have negative estimates for the 
increment of bear market alpha. Consistent with the previous findings in this study, the 
risk-managed factor momentum portfolios have higher alphas (?̂?0) than plain factor 
momentum portfolios. However, the sample period in Panel B is significantly shorter 
than in Panel A. The CS 6-1, 6-6 and 12-1, and TS 12-1 portfolios have significant exposure 
on the market risk, and all factor momentum portfolios have a negative market exposure 
during bear markets regardless whether the contemporaneous market return is positive 
or negative. This market risk is partly removed by the volatility scaling in Panel B. 
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Table 18. Optionality of factor momentum portfolios.  
Panel A – Optionality of factor momentum portfolios 
C Variable CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1 
?̂?0 1 1.092 0.632 0.540 0.562 0.736 0.412 0.354 
   (5.43) (3.51) (1.93) (3.14) (5.08) (2.96) (2.70) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 -0.736 -0.033 1.573 -0.199 -0.494 -0.062 0.272 
   (-1.16) (-0.06) (1.78) (-0.35) (-1.08) (-0.14) (0.66) 
?̂?0 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.046 0.169 0.394 0.238 -0.063 0.058 0.108 
   (-0.93) (3.79) (5.69) (5.35) (-1.74) (1.67) (3.33) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.374 -0.499 -0.491 -0.563 -0.234 -0.253 -0.220 
   (-2.76) (-4.12) (-2.61) (-4.67) (-2.40) (-2.70) (-2.49) 
?̂?𝐵,𝑈 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ I𝑈,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
0.317 0.108 -0.595 0.080 0.146 -0.060 -0.157 
  (1.47) (0.56) (-1.99) (0.42) (0.94) (-0.40) (-1.12) 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.051 0.076 0.074 0.037 0.041 0.046 
    
 Panel B - Optionality of risk-managed factor momentum portfolios 
C Variable CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1* 
?̂?0 1 1.380 0.762 0.569 0.810 1.005 0.429 0.502 
   (5.17) (3.24) (1.49) (3.41) (5.17) (2.33) (2.84) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 -1.199 -0.900 1.150 -0.100 -1.286 -0.506 -0.057 
   (-1.16) (-0.99) (0.78) (-0.11) (-1.71) (-0.71) (-0.08) 
?̂?0 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.215 0.067 0.274 0.100 -0.168 0.018 0.030 
   (-3.05) (1.08) (2.72) (1.60) (-3.27) (0.37) (0.65) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.058 -0.373 -0.305 -0.312 -0.081 -0.121 -0.083 
   (-0.31) (-2.28) (-1.15) (-1.88) (-0.60) (-0.95) (-0.67) 
?̂?𝐵,𝑈 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ I𝑈,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
0.348 0.293 -0.497 -0.184 0.244 -0.053 -0.227 
  (1.03) (0.98) (-1.03) (-0.61) (0.99) (-0.23) (-1.01) 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.009 0.022 0.035 0.037 0.007 0.016 
 
The regression estimates in Table 18 are similar to what Grobys et al. (2018) find with 
industry-momentum portfolios. Similarities in return behavior between industry and 
factor momentum portfolios could be explained by the finding of Arnott et al. (2018) and 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) that factor momentum portfolios subsume industry 
momentum.  
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Table 19 presents the regression estimates of (20) separately for the winner- (Panel A) 
and loser-factor (Panel B) portfolios. The sample period is July 1965–December 2019. 
Assessing the optionality of the winner- and loser-factor portfolios separately shows that 
only the loser-factor portfolio of the CS 1-1 strategy exhibits optionality. However, the 
estimate for the up-market beta in bear markets is only slightly negative (-0.219), and 
the corresponding beta for the WML portfolio is -0.103. In contrast, Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) report that the up-market beta estimate in bear markets for the price 
momentum portfolio is -1.796. 
 
Table 19. Optionality of winner- and loser-factor portfolios. 
Panel A – Optionality of winner-factor portfolios 
C Variable CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1 
?̂?0 1 0.980 0.819 1.213 0.749 0.780 0.553 0.569 
   (8.59) (7.53) (6.58) (7.00) (9.83) (6.66) (7.66) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 0.239 0.088 1.131 -0.120 -0.049 0.179 0.229 
   (0.66) (0.26) (1.95) (-0.36) (-0.19) (0.68) (0.98) 
?̂?0 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.116 -0.029 -0.046 0.012 -0.120 -0.074 -0.077 
   (-4.09) (-1.08) (-1.01) (0.44) (-6.12) (-3.62) (-4.17) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.161 -0.271 -0.303 -0.357 -0.064 -0.092 -0.047 
   (-2.10) (-3.69) (-2.45) (-4.96) (-1.20) (-1.65) (-0.94) 
?̂?𝐵,𝑈 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ I𝑈,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
-0.047 0.006 -0.337 0.147 -0.010 -0.048 -0.112 
  (-0.38) (0.05) (-1.71) (1.28) (-0.12) (-0.54) (-1.42) 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.102 0.113 0.090 0.125 0.090 0.106 
    
 Panel B - Optionality of loser-factor portfolios 
C Variable CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1 
?̂?0 1 -0.112 0.187 0.673 0.187 0.044 0.141 0.215 
   (-0.89) (1.70) (3.76) (1.65) (0.44) (1.49) (2.29) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 0.974 0.121 -0.442 0.079 0.446 0.241 -0.043 
   (2.45) (0.35) (-0.78) (0.22) (1.41) (0.81) (-0.14) 
?̂?0 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 -0.069 -0.198 -0.440 -0.226 -0.058 -0.132 -0.185 
   (-2.21) (-7.27) (-9.92) (-8.04) (-2.33) (-5.63) (-7.96) 
?̂?𝐵 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 0.213 0.229 0.188 0.205 0.170 0.161 0.173 
   (2.50) (3.09) (1.56) (2.69) (2.53) (2.53) (2.74) 
?̂?𝐵,𝑈 I𝐵,𝑡−1 ∙ I𝑈,𝑡
∙ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
-0.363 -0.102 0.258 0.067 -0.156 0.012 0.045 
  (-2.70) (-0.87) (1.35) (0.55) (-1.46) (0.12) (0.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.071 0.135 0.089 0.008 0.048 0.085 
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Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) show that the portfolio of extreme loser stocks has a strong 
up-market beta and high ?̂?𝐵,𝑈 in bear markets whereas the portfolio of extreme winner 
stocks has a lower estimate for the up-market beta and slightly negative estimate for 
?̂?𝐵,𝑈. The results of Table 19 show that winner-factor portfolios have negative up-market 
betas in bear markets and loser-factor portfolios have either slightly negative or slightly 
positive up-market betas. Interestingly, the ?̂?0 for the CS 1-1 winner factor portfolio is 
significantly positive and the estimate for the bear market alpha increment is 
insignificant but positive. In contrast, the ?̂?0  for the CS 1-1 loser factor portfolio is 
insignificant while the bear market alpha increment is significantly high.  
 
Table 20 reports the 15 worst monthly returns for the UMD factor in a similar way as 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016, p. 227) and Grobys et al. (2018, p. 11) report the worst 
price momentum returns with the corresponding market and industry momentum 
returns. Along with the UMD return, Table 20 reports the contemporaneous 1-1 factor 
momentum returns. The results of Table 20 confirm that CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies are 
not subject to the same momentum crashes as the UMD factor.  
 
Table 20. Worst monthly UMD returns. 
 Date UMD CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 1-1* TS 1-1* 
1 04/2009 -34.39 % 36.91 % 15.56 % 16.72 % 7.05 % 
2 01/2001 -25.06 % -14.31 % -10.39 % -10.66 % -7.74 % 
3 11/2002 -16.18 % 13.46 % 12.62 % 8.64 % 8.11 % 
4 05/2009 -12.44 % 5.91 % 3.93 % 3.24 % 2.16 % 
5 03/2009 -11.38 % -12.83 % -7.29 % -5.54 % -3.15 % 
6 05/2003 -10.78 % 11.79 % 6.38 % 11.11 % 6.02 % 
7 04/2003 -9.47 % -10.71 % -7.18 % -7.35 % -4.93 % 
8 05/2000 -9.08 % 13.00 % 12.33 % 9.93 % 9.41 % 
9 04/1999 -9.07 % 6.70 % 5.42 % 5.76 % 4.66 % 
10 08/2009 -8.84 % 15.51 % 8.65 % 11.97 % 6.67 % 
11 01/2019 -8.68 % -11.51 % -5.53 % -9.05 % -4.35 % 
12 04/2000 -8.58 % 4.44 % 7.08 % 3.68 % 5.87 % 
13 11/2001 -8.58 % 3.59 % -1.17 % 2.14 % -0.70 % 
14 10/2001 -8.42 % -11.67 % -7.12 % -7.31 % -4.46 % 
15 04/2001 -7.97 % -9.95 % -14.03 % -6.95 % -9.79 % 
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Table 21 reports the 15 worst monthly CS 1-1 (Panel A) and TS 1-1 (Panel B) returns along 
with the corresponding returns for the risk-managed portfolios. Both cross-sectional and 
time-series strategies have similar crashes, and the monthly drawdowns are less 
negative for risk-managed factor momentum portfolios.  
 
Table 21. Worst monthly CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 returns. 
Panel A – Worst monthly CS 1-1 returns 
 Date CS 1-1 UMD TS 1-1 CS 1-1* TS 1-1* 
1 06/2000 -26.51 % 16.59 % -22.46 % -22.42 % -18.99 % 
2 01/2001 -14.31 % -25.06 % -10.39 % -10.66 % -7.74 % 
3 03/2009 -12.83 % -11.38 % -7.29 % -5.54 % -3.15 % 
4 03/2000 -12.35 % -6.39 % -11.62 % -10.57 % -9.94 % 
5 12/2002 -11.96 % 9.64 % -3.71 % -8.70 % -2.70 % 
6 10/2001 -11.67 % -8.42 % -7.12 % -7.31 % -4.46 % 
7 01/2019 -11.51 % -8.68 % -5.53 % -9.05 % -4.35 % 
8 10/2011 -10.80 % -1.42 % -6.55 % -5.03 % -3.05 % 
9 04/2003 -10.71 % -9.47 % -7.18 % -7.35 % -4.93 % 
10 07/2008 -10.34 % -5.14 % -7.73 % -8.63 % -6.46 % 
11 09/2019 -10.33 % -6.85 % -5.84 % -10.88 % -6.15 % 
12 04/2001 -9.95 % -7.97 % -14.03 % -6.95 % -9.79 % 
13 10/2002 -8.46 % -5.30 % -5.32 % -4.26 % -2.68 % 
14 12/2008 -7.99 % -5.08 % -2.28 % -2.89 % -0.82 % 
15 07/2009 -7.48 % -5.36 % -5.31 % -5.68 % -4.03 % 
Panel B – Worst monthly TS 1-1 returns 
 Date TS 1-1 UMD CS 1-1 CS 1-1* TS 1-1* 
1 06/2000 -22.46 % 16.59 % -26.51 % -22.42 % -18.99 % 
2 04/2001 -14.03 % -7.97 % -9.95 % -6.95 % -9.79 % 
3 03/2000 -11.62 % -6.39 % -12.35 % -10.57 % -9.94 % 
4 01/2001 -10.39 % -25.06 % -14.31 % -10.66 % -7.74 % 
5 01/2012 -9.24 % -7.96 % -6.28 % -5.37 % -7.90 % 
6 07/2008 -7.73 % -5.14 % -10.34 % -8.63 % -6.46 % 
7 03/2009 -7.29 % -11.38 % -12.83 % -5.54 % -3.15 % 
8 04/2003 -7.18 % -9.47 % -10.71 % -7.35 % -4.93 % 
9 10/2001 -7.12 % -8.42 % -11.67 % -7.31 % -4.46 % 
10 06/1999 -6.92 % 4.88 % -6.15 % -4.85 % -5.45 % 
11 08/2000 -6.89 % 5.71 % -2.96 % -2.86 % -6.64 % 
12 10/2011 -6.55 % -1.42 % -10.80 % -5.03 % -3.05 % 
13 09/2019 -5.84 % -6.85 % -10.33 % -10.88 % -6.15 % 
14 01/2019 -5.53 % -8.68 % -11.51 % -9.05 % -4.35 % 
15 09/2015 -5.40 % 5.33 % -6.45 % -4.54 % -3.80 % 
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7 Conclusions 
The results regarding factor returns are consistent with previous studies. Factor returns 
are positively autocorrelated, and the correlations between factor returns are generally 
low, similar to what Gupta and Kelly (2019) find. Factor returns are predictable from prior 
1- and 12-month returns, and negative factor returns are not long-lasting. These results 
have two important implications for factor momentum strategies. First, betting that prior 
1- to 12-month winner factors continue to perform well is profitable, but betting against 
recent loser factors is only profitable with the factors that have the worst prior 1-month 
returns. Effectively, only the cross-sectional 1-1 strategy captures negative short-side 
returns. Second, because factors have generally low or even negative correlations, factor 
momentum strategies can be constructed with a relatively low number of factors.  
 
Factor momentum portfolios generate robust returns that exceed the returns of 
individual factors. The five-factor model of Fama and French (2015) cannot explain factor 
momentum returns. After controlling for the six-factor model of Fama and French (2018), 
three out of seven factor momentum portfolios have statistically significant alphas, and 
two of the factor momentum portfolios have significant alphas after controlling for the 
three-factor model of Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019). Both cross-sectional and time-series 
strategies perform best with a one-month formation and holding periods. Contrary to 
the results of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), I find that cross-
sectional strategies have higher average returns than time-series strategies on equal 
formation periods. Furthermore, the cross-sectional and time-series portfolios that are 
formed using 1-month lagged returns have robust excess returns in all considered 
specifications. 
 
Consistent with Stambaugh et al. (2012), the average long-short factor returns are 
generally at the highest following periods of high investor sentiment because short-side 
portfolios become relatively more overpriced than long-side portfolios. In contrast, the 
long-short factor returns are low and generally below the unconditional average returns 
following periods of low investor sentiment because mispricing becomes less 
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pronounced. Because each factor is likely to capture a different type of mispricing, the 
contemporaneous investor sentiment affects mispricing and factor returns differently—
two of the factors have the highest average returns following mild investor sentiment 
and one following low investor sentiment. 
 
Against the expected results and the findings of Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), the 
differences in long-short factor momentum returns are not statistically significant 
between periods of high and low investor sentiment. WML factor momentum returns 
are highest following mild investor sentiment because the variation in long-short factor 
returns is at the highest. Winner-factor portfolios capture mispricing in all investor 
sentiment states, and loser-factor portfolios only after periods of high investor sentiment. 
The returns of the loser-factor portfolios increase with the length of the formation 
period, suggesting that the contrary short-term mispricing is not as persistent as long-
term mispricing. Regressing the factor momentum returns on the three-factor model of 
Daniel and Hirshleifer (2019) suggest that the returns of winner-factor portfolios are 
driven by positive earnings surprises, and the returns of loser-factor portfolios are driven 
by negative earnings surprises.  
 
Although the WML factor momentum returns are not significantly different between 
high and low investor sentiment, the investor sentiment and varying mispricing have an 
important implication on factor momentum’s performance. Betting against the recent 
loser factors increases the performance of factor momentum following periods of low 
or mild investor sentiment but decreases the performance after periods of high investor 
sentiment. A cross-sectional 1-1 factor momentum strategy that is always long two 
winner factors and short two loser factors only after periods of low or mild investor 
sentiment achieves a monthly average return of 1.20%.   
 
Risk-managed factor momentum portfolios have statistically significant alphas against 
the unscaled portfolios. Although factor momentum portfolios do no exhibit optionality 
in bear markets, the average returns of factor momentum portfolios can be increased 
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while lowering the return volatility using option-implied market volatility to scale the 
portfolio weights. Furthermore, the optionality regressions show that factor momentum 
portfolios generally have significant market risk, and this risk is partly removed with 
volatility scaling. 
 
An issue that was not addressed in this thesis is the trading costs of the factor 
momentum strategy. Since factor momentum portfolios are rebalanced monthly, the 
trading costs have a negative impact on the net returns. The issue of trading costs is 
discussed by Gupta and Kelly (2019), who find that both cross-sectional and time-series 
factor momentum portfolios with a one-month holding period have higher Sharpe ratios 
than price momentum or industry momentum strategies after controlling for trading 
costs. Because factor momentum strategy manages to time investments profitably in 
different factors, the strategy could be constructed using ETFs that aim to replicate factor 
returns. This idea is left for future research.  
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Appendix 1. Description of factor construction   
P
o
rt
fo
lio
 r
eb
al
an
ci
n
g
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
 M
o
n
th
ly
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
 A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 
A
n
n
u
al
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
Ju
n
e
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 
A
ll 
fa
ct
o
r 
p
o
rt
fo
lio
s 
(e
xc
e
p
t 
B
A
B
) 
u
se
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 N
Y
SE
 m
ar
ke
t 
eq
u
it
y 
as
 a
 s
iz
e 
b
re
ak
p
o
in
t.
 F
ac
to
r 
b
re
ak
p
o
in
ts
 a
re
 t
h
e 
30
th
 a
n
d
 7
0t
h
 N
Y
SE
 
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
s 
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g 
to
 t
h
e 
so
rt
in
g 
fa
ct
o
r.
 B
A
B
 p
o
rt
fo
lio
 r
et
u
rn
s 
ar
e 
ra
n
k-
w
ei
gh
te
d
, a
ll 
o
th
er
 p
o
rt
fo
lio
s 
ar
e 
va
lu
e
-w
ei
gh
te
d
. 
  
Sh
o
rt
-s
id
e 
p
o
rt
fo
lio
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 G
ro
w
th
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 G
ro
w
th
) 
 
H
ig
h
-b
et
a 
st
o
ck
s 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 B
/M
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 B
/M
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 C
F/
P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 C
F/
P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 D
/P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 D
/P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 E
/P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 E
/P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 B
/M
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 B
/M
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 O
P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 S
m
al
l O
P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 q
u
al
it
y 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 q
u
al
it
y)
 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 r
et
u
rn
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 r
et
u
rn
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 r
et
u
rn
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 r
et
u
rn
) 
 
Lo
n
g-
si
d
e 
p
o
rt
fo
lio
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 G
ro
w
th
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 G
ro
w
th
) 
 
Lo
w
-b
et
a 
st
o
ck
s 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 B
/M
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 B
/M
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 C
F/
P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 C
F/
P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 D
/P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 D
/P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 E
/P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 E
/P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 B
/M
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 B
/M
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 O
P
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 O
P
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 q
u
al
it
y 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 q
u
al
it
y)
 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 L
o
w
 r
et
u
rn
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 L
o
w
 r
et
u
rn
) 
 
0.
5 
x 
(S
m
al
l &
 H
ig
h
 r
et
u
rn
 
+ 
B
ig
 &
 H
ig
h
 r
et
u
rn
) 
 
So
rt
in
g 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
In
ve
st
m
en
t)
 
U
n
iv
ar
ia
te
 o
n
 m
ar
ke
t 
b
e
ta
 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
B
/M
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
C
FP
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
D
P
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
E/
P
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 D
ep
e
n
d
en
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
B
/M
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
O
P
) 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 D
ep
e
n
d
en
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
Q
u
al
it
y)
 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
p
ri
o
r 
(t
-1
) 
re
tu
rn
 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 In
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
(2
 S
iz
e 
x 
3 
P
ri
o
r 
(t
-1
2 
to
 t
-2
) 
re
tu
rn
) 
Fa
ct
o
r 
A
SS
ET
G
 
B
A
B
 
B
M
 
C
FP
 
D
P 
EP
 
H
M
L D
 
O
P
 
Q
M
J 
ST
R
 
U
M
D
 
103 
Appendix 2. Factor momentum portfolios with big- and small-cap factors   
Panel A presents the summary statistics for factor momentum portfolios that are formed 
using big- and small-capitalization factors and without HMLD and BAB factors. For 
example, the return for ASSETGSmall is calculated as follows: 
 
 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝐺𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 & 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑣 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 & 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑣
. 
 
The cross-sectional factor momentum portfolios are long (short) two factors with the 
highest (lowest) formation period returns, and the time-series factor momentum 
portfolios are long (short) factors with above (below) the median formation period 
returns. Panel B presents the regression estimates for the three-factor model of Daniel 
and Hirshleifer (2019). The sample period spans from July 1972 to December 2018. 
 
Panel A – Summary statistics      
  
CS 1-1 
(Big) 
CS 1-1 
(Small) 
CS 6-1 
(Big) 
CS 6-1 
(Small) 
TS 1-1 
(Big) 
TS 1-1 
(Small) 
TS 6-1 
(Big) 
TS 6-1 
(Small) 
Mean 0.57 % 0.78 % 0.32 % 0.55 % 0.54 % 0.50 % 0.22 % 0.47 % 
  (3.17) (4.74) (1.93) (3.61) (3.90) (3.83) (1.76) (3.80) 
Max 28.1 % 34.8 % 24.5 % 35.7 % 20.2 % 19.7 % 17.1 % 30.6 % 
Min -19.2 % -27.1 % -17.5 % -20.4 % -13.7 % -20.7 % -17.5 % -29.6 % 
SD 4.67 % 4.26 % 4.34 % 3.95 % 3.58 % 3.36 % 3.30 % 3.17 % 
Skewness 0.46 0.12 -0.07 0.48 0.16 -0.32 -0.42 -0.17 
Kurtosis 7.54 15.10 6.17 15.83 6.67 10.05 6.78 28.38 
Panel B – DH3 model 
     
  
CS 1-1 
(Big) 
CS 1-1 
(Small) 
CS 6-1 
(Big) 
CS 6-1 
(Small) 
TS 1-1 
(Big) 
TS 1-1 
(Small) 
TS 6-1 
(Big) 
TS 6-1 
(Small) 
Alpha 0.096 0.525 -0.178 0.194 0.238 0.326 0.002 0.243 
  (0.38) (1.87) (-0.85) (0.84) (1.24) (1.68) (0.01) (1.13) 
MKT-RF -0.067 -0.074 -0.014 -0.041 -0.088 -0.061 -0.070 -0.039 
 
(-0.94) (-0.93) (-0.20) (-0.52) (-1.35) (-1.02) (-1.17) (-0.58) 
FIN 0.172 0.091 -0.040 -0.056 0.150 0.099 -0.087 -0.070 
 
(1.93) (0.50) (-0.51) (-0.29) (1.53) (0.77) (-1.03) (-0.43) 
PEAD 0.571 0.550 0.677 0.710 0.346 0.353 0.440 0.492 
 
(2.93) (2.43) (4.03) (3.74) (2.61) (2.29) (3.60) (2.85) 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.068 0.076 0.107 0.078 0.059 0.070 0.082 
 
